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Far-reaching scientific and technological visions are on the upswing. They promise 
to solve major problems such as the climate change or energy supply and to fulfil 
the ancient dreams of mankind such as decelerating or even eliminating the ageing 
process or creating artificial life. What initially sounds like earthly impressions of 
paradise may induce unease, concern and fear at the same time. The historical 
experience with regard to technology suggests to assume that ambivalences and 
risks cannot be avoided and that these might be bigger, the more extensive the 
technological interventions in nature and society will be and the more rapidly they 
will be made. The gap between hopes and expectations regarding progress on 
the one hand and concern and fears on the other hand is getting larger and larger 
and the waves of corresponding hope, hype and fear technologies come in rapid 
succession. This situation is a challenge both for social debates and for political 
decisions, e.g. research promotion and funding, and thus represents a topic of 
technology assessment – an example of topics this »TAB-Brief« is focusing on.
Scientific and technological visions are 
an important point of reference of the 
technology debate within society. In 
history, various forms of these visions 
played a significant role, e.g. for 
astronautics and nuclear energy – fields 
on which virtually utopian expectations 
were placed in the 1950s and 1960s. 
After years of disillusionment, 
scientific and technological visions 
are discussed again to an increased 
extent since the beginning of the 
century – even in the feature pages 
of the daily newspapers. Particularly 
in the field of nanotechnology 
(Drexler 1986), the Converging 
Technologies (Roco/Bainbridge 2002) 
and their interfaces to information 
technology and biotechnology 
as well as currently to synthetic 
biology, a lively communication has 
started about visions that are rather 
speculative and are reaching far into 
the future. Normally, hope and hype 
communication is soon followed by a 
wave of concern and then of fear.
Very often, it is a matter of one state-
ment against another one or of positive 
expectation against feared risks. It is 
often very difficult to evaluate whether 
the things expected or feared in those 
visions have to be considered as a 
serious possibility or whether they are 
mere speculation. Now, one might say 
that all this is a colourful, more or less 
intellectual game, which – due to its 
highly speculative character – is only 
a sort of communicative background 
noise without real consequences. 
This, however, is not the case. Visions 
have a partly significant influence 
on the perception of scientific and 
technological lines of development, 
on the public assessment and opinion 
regarding these topics and on the form 
and content of social debates with 
regard to scientific and technological 
progress in general. Speculative 
expectations as well as fears can 
structure risk debates, influence 
research promotion and decide on 
the acceptance of entire areas of 
technology. The risk debate about 
nanotechnology, for example, did 
not start with the obvious subject of 
a possible toxicity of nanoparticles for 
human health and the environment, but 
with futuristic considerations whether 
nanotechnology could make humans 
redundant due to self-replicating 
robots (Joy 2000) – a discussion with 
far-reaching consequences although it 
is rather irrelevant in substance.
The situation of visions – both hopes and 
fears – being able to have a considerable 
factual impact though they might be 
merely speculative, is the core challenge 
for public debates, politics and thus for 
technology assessment. Despite all the 
differences of the respective areas of 
science and technology, this involves 
similar structural problems:
> Definition problem: Often, it is 
hard to evaluate what characterizes 
e.g. nanotechnology or synthetic 
biology and what is new about it. 
This results in debates with regard 
to characterization and definition 
combined with the skeptical 
question whether the respective 
hype technology might be just 
an attractive label to attract 
attention.
> Technological determinism: In 
the debates about hope and hype 
technologies, these mostly are 
assumed to have a deterministic 
intrinsic logic: It is said that the 
respective problems could be solved 
on a merely technical basis (e.g. 
the climate change problem could 
be solved by means of climate 
engineering) and the technologies 
themselves would result either in a 
catastrophe (Joy 2000) or in positive 
developments (more democracy due 
to the Internet).
> Content of values: Hopes and fears, 
packed in visions, are a complex 
mixture of knowledge, estimates, 
ignorance, values and often also 
interests. Thus, they are normatively 
loaded and express the different 
perspectives and conflicts of a 
pluralistic society. These contents 
of visions often are not transparent 
which makes it difficult to discuss 
the different arguments.
> Hidden interests: Stories about 
hope and hype as well as other 
types of futures (e.g. energy 
scenarios) can be used (and are used 
indeed) to transport interests, for 
example to create acceptance and 
to develop funding and promotion 
opportunities.
> Ambivalence: The visionary pathos 
in many technological visions 
is susceptible to the question 
whether things might turn out 



















Nfears in view of the possibility of 
self-organizing systems getting out 
of control. The field of synthetic 
biology, presented by Arnold Sauter, 
consequently gets on with the visions 
of nanotechnology in the different 
areas of life. Here, as it is the case 
for many hype and hope technologies, 
the definition problem is an inherent 
characteristic: Is synthetic biology 
really a new area of research or 
is it just a label to attract public 
attention and to mobilize research 
promotion? Geoengineering, a rela-
tively new approach for a large-scale 
solution of the climate problem by 
artificially »cooling« the Earth – a 
topic introduced by Claudio Caviezel 
– induces fascination and horror at the 
same time due to the global dimension 
of targeted interventions in the climate 
system.
In order to facilitate orientation in 
these areas of controversial hopes, 
expectations, concerns and fears, 
transparent and comprehensible 
criteria as well as appropriate 
procedures for a consideration of 
arguments and decision are required. 
Technology assessment – also and 
particularly in parliaments – has 
the specific mission of providing a 
rational and transparent review 
of the contents of scientific and 
technological visions as a basis for an 
informed and reflected consultation 
of politics and society (Grunwald 
2009).
Armin Grunwald
it is almost sure that this question 
will be asked. Positive visions 
might become horror scenarios and 
utopias might become dystopias. 
The history of nanotechnology, but 
also the history of the Internet, is 
rich in ambivalence (Grunwald 
2006).
> Inflation problem: Hope and hype 
technologies focus on the new thing 
about them, because only like this it 
is possible to raise scientific, public 
and political awareness. As public 
awareness is a scarce good, there 
will be an inflation of scientific 
promises followed by the risk of 
an increasing lack of credibility.
This focus can only deal with some 
aspects of the comprehensive field. 
One of the great hype stories of 
the present time – with almost two 
decades of ups and downs already 
– refers to the relation of Internet 
and democracy. Ulrich Riehm deals 
with the historical roots of this 
relation and elaborates hopes, fears 
and disappointments which have 
characterized the co-evolution of 
Internet and democracy and which 
are still present in today’s debates. 
Nanotechnology as the field which 
boosted scientific and technological 
visions to a considerable extent 
(Drexler 1986) will be introduced by 
Christoph Revermann. On the one 
hand, it fascinates due to the idea of a 
homo faber working on the molecular 
level who puts together atoms and 
molecules in a very targeted way – 
and on the other hand, it arouses 
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N The democratic upheaval in Tunisia and Egypt in spring 2011 once again has drawn 
the public’s attention to the potential of the Internet with regard to democratic 
movements. While some considered the »Arab Spring« to be a revolution mainly 
supported by Facebook and Twitter, others emphasized the possibility of the 
ruling parties to use the Internet for surveillance, censorship and manipulation 
purposes. In this debate, typical patterns of a controversial debate regarding 
»cyberdemocracy« – which has been conducted for more than 50 years now – 
came to the fore. The following article deals with these discussions. First of all, 
it traces the technological and sociopolitical development trends which have 
induced the debate about digital democracy. Then, hopes and fears are presented 
as they appear for information, communication, participation and elections 
supported by information technology in a democracy. Electronic petitions of the 
German Bundestag serve as a current example of a specific project of e-democracy. 
Reconstruction shows that it is not possible to determine any cycles of the debate 
in which disappointments and warnings of dangers supersede (exaggerated) 
hopes. In fact, the typical patterns of reasoning of a debate with pros and cons 
are present right from the beginning.
If we try to reconstruct a debate 
about the significance of the Internet 
for politics which is conducted under 
the heading of cyberdemocracy, 
digital democracy, e-democracy, 
teledemocracy or similar terms, 
then we should recapitulate both 
the technological and sociopolitical 





THE LONG ROAD TO THE INTERNET
The first developments regarding 
computer networking started in the 
United States in the 1950s and 1960s, 
mainly in a scientific context, with the 
research authority of the United States 
Department of Defense – the former 
Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA, later DARPA) – playing an 
essential role due to the allocation of 
research funds. 29th October 1969 is 
considered to be the day of the first 
remote connection of two computers, 
namely between the University of 
California (UCLA) and the Stanford 
Research Institute (SRI). In 1983, 
the TCP/IP protocol was introduced 
in the former ARPANET which 
subsequently was spread worldwide 
and today still represents the technical 
basis of the Internet. An application 
of the Internet which developed in 
the 1960s and today still dominates 
is the transmission of text messages 
(e-mail). A completely new quality 
of the Internet was achieved at the 
beginning of the 1990s with the 
establishment of the HTTP protocol 
and graphical web browsers. From 
most users’ view, this »World Wide 
Web« today has become the real 
»Internet« which integrates numerous, 
totally different applications under a 
single interface. Another characteristic 
break regarding the development 
of the Internet was its conversion 
from a mainly government-funded 
science network to a commercial 
computer network: The first domain 
for a business company was assigned 
in 1985 (symbolics.com). Then, in 
1995, the Internet backbone in the 
United States was handed over from 
the National Science Foundation to 
commercial providers (Werle 2002).
However, with the development of 
the Internet alone, the technical 
development would be described 
too one-dimensionally. In fact, 
interconnected communication 
networks developed thanks to the 
opportunities of electronic data 
transmission (via telephone networks) 
and to the emergence of home 
computers and PCs from the mid-
1970s both in decentralized, private 
initiatives (e.g. the »FidoNet« mailbox 
system since 1984) and by commercial 
companies or public telephone 
companies. Of vital importance 
for the development of computer-
mediated social communities has 
been the Electronic Information 
Exchange System (EIES) from 1976 
on (Hiltz/Turoff 1978) or the Whole 
Earth ’Lectronic Link (The WELL) 
from 1985 on (Rheingold 1993). An 
example of commercially successful 
electronic communication services 
of that time in the United States is 
e.g. CompuServe. In Europe, online 
services have been developed under 
the auspices of public telephone 
companies from the 1970s on, which 
initially focused on a combination 
of remote data transmission (via 
telephone) and TV sets and later 
focused on specific terminals and 
the emerging home and personal 
computers. Whereas the »Minitel« 
online service was successfully 
established in France during the 
1980s, the introduction of such 
systems e.g. in Great Britain (called 
Prestel) or in Germany (interactive 
videotex system called Btx) was less 
successful.
From the middle of the 1990s, all these 
systems have been ousted or superseded 
more or less completely by the 
Internet. However, these technological 
developments, which are independent 
of the Internet, are of a certain 
relevance, because they also incited 
essential discussions with regard to 
the significance of information and 
communication technologies for 
politics and democracy.
DEMOCRACY’S NEW CLOTHES – 
INTERNET AND POLITICS
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N(study group for system research) in 
Heidelberg, which gave essential 
impetus for scientific policy advice 
as well as for the development of 
technology assessment in Germany 
(Brinckmann 2006). He criticized 
the lack of representation of citizens 
in democracy and considered the 
idea of computer democracy to 
be an opportunity of stronger 
participation of citizens. In 1971, 
a prototypical implementation of 
computer democracy was realized 
in cooperation with the WDR (West 
German Broadcasting). Under 
the direction of the well-known 
journalist Werner Höfer, the 
controversial topic of »environmental 
protection« was discussed within 
the framework of a TV show. The 
scientific state of knowledge with 
regard to currently emerging issues 
could be investigated by means of a 
computer-supported database. The 
viewers’ opinions were taken into 
consideration »interactively« by 
means of telephone surveys.
HOPES AND FEARS
In general, it can be said that the 
capacities for storing, processing 
and transmitting data are enhanced 
considerably by the use of computers. 
Thus, more data can be stored, 
processed and transmitted in a shorter 
period of time and at lower costs. 
Moreover, there are three technological 
»M trends«: Computers are getting 
smaller (»micro«), increasingly 
mobile and are increasingly based on 
multimedia.
What does this mean for the hopes and 
fears regarding cyberdemocracy? For 
this, it would make sense to distinguish 
four functional areas which can be 
supported in the political process by 
the use of computers: information, 
communication, consultation /
participation and decision.
THE DEMOCRATIC AWAKENING SINCE 
THE 1960s
It is even more difficult to describe 
the social, sociocultural and political 
aspects of this development, because 
it is more complex and heterogeneous. 
In the United States, the 1950s and 
1960s were characterized by a strong 
faith in technology and science as well 
as by large-scale public projects. A 
typical example are the American 
aerospace research program – from 
the first satellite to the landing on 
the moon – but also the »General 
Problem Solver« (GPS) developed by 
Herbert Simon and Allen Newell, 
a »program that simulates human 
thought« (as written in an article of 
1961). The belief to be able to change 
society »for the better« and to make 
it become »more rational« by means 
of technology certainly is rooted 
here. John F. Kennedy’s government 
program »New Frontier« gave this 
faith a political shape.
Completely different, but similarly 
shaping, was a specific American 
technoliberal culture of the 1960s 
which included both the computer 
developers in the legendary »garages« 
and the subcultural, alternative 
and political civil-rights, anti-
war and student movements. The 
rebellion of students and of other 
groups of the population against 
the »establishment« also took 
place in Europe with its specific 
characteristics and called for extensive 
democratization. In 1969, Willy 
Brandt’s governmental declaration 
took up this claim with the slogan 
»Let’s dare more democracy« and 
in 1982, the political scientist Max 
Kaase diagnosed a »participatory 
revolution«. The findings regarding 
a crisis of democracy combined with 
a call for its modernization and 
revitalization have remained a central 
theme of the political, public and 
political science debate for decades 
now, so that proponents of electronic 
democracy could always take up the 
topic.
EARLY EXPERIMENTS: ELECTRONIC 
TOWN HALL MEETINGS AND COMPUTER 
DEMOCRACY
Thus, the debate about (exaggerated) 
hopes and fears regarding a democ-
racy which is enhanced in terms of 
communication technology is not a 
debate only of the past few years. An 
early experiment in the United States 
of the 1970s was the above-mentioned 
Electronic Information Exchange 
System (EIES) which primarily 
was conceived as an information, 
communication and publication 
system for scientific communities, but 
for which the application regarding 
an »electronic direct democracy« 
was considered already: »The most 
exciting and potentially revolution-
ary political application of a CC 
system [computer conference] is the 
facilitation of the direct participation 
and voting of citizens on important 
state of national issues.« (Hiltz/
Turoff 1978, p. 197).
Here, Hiltz/Turoff refer to Amitai 
Etzioni’s works of the beginning of 
the 1970s concerning electronically 
communicated »town hall meetings« 
(Etzioni et al. 1975). For this purpose, 
the new possibilities of telephone 
conferences were used. Etzioni 
developed the idea of a national dialog 
via the pyramidal structure of small 
groups the delegates of which giving 
information to the next higher level. 
Telephone conferences allowed group 
dialogs even over long distances, in 
a rather short period of time and at 
low costs.
In Germany, Helmut Krauch prop-
agated the idea of »computer democ-
racy« already in 1972 (Krauch 
1972). In 1958, Krauch founded the 
»Studiengruppe für Systemforschung« 
6

















N INFORMATION – THE ELIXIR OF POLITICS
Democracy relies on informed citizens 
and politicians. The hope regarding 
cyberdemocracy is that a more 
comprehensive and better accessibility 
to (political) information could involve 
an improved functioning of democracy 
due to increased transparency and a 
higher level of information. Information 
is considered to be a fundamental 
resource for further types of political 
participation.
In fact, today, political information can 
be accessed electronically to an extent 
which was barely imaginable some 
years ago. This information is provided 
by political institutions themselves 
(governments, parliaments), but also 
by the media, by citizens, associations 
and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). Besides, »unofficial« data 
collections such as »WikiLeaks« have 
become more and more important. 
They by far not only consist of factual 
and textual information available 
worldwide, but also of multimedia 
documents such as speeches and 
interviews as audio, image and video 
files. There can be no doubt that the 
transparency of political processes and 
institutions has increased considerably. 
The targeted search for political 
information independent of place and 
time has been facilitated substantially.
However, in cyberdemocracy not only 
much more political information is 
available than ever before, political 
activities themselves permanently 
generate new »data traces« and the 
search for information and their 
dissemination can be traced as a 
matter of principle. For this reason, 
there was fear right from the beginning 
that with political information being 
digitalized the possibilities of citizen 
surveillance by the state or by large 
corporations would be extended 
considerably (Donk/Tops 1992, p. 180 
f.; Hiltz/Turoff 1978, p. 486 ff.).
The hope that more political 
information, which can be accessed 
more easily by citizens, would 
stimulate and improve democracy 
is based on an understanding of 
politics as a rational process. The 
better politics are informed, the more 
political action can be improved, 
because it would be more »rational«. 
However, this neglects the fact that 
»information« in a political process is 
evaluated against the background of 
political basic concepts and interests 
and that different conclusions are 
drawn from this subsequently (Donk/
Tops 1992, p. 183).
Again and again, hopes have been 
placed in a more immediate and direct 
exchange of information between 
politicians and citizens. Mediating 
entities, particularly the media 
with their own interests, forms of 
presentation and agendas, then could 
become dispensable. This would offer 
the advantage of political actors being 
able to transmit their information to 
the respective addressee in an unbiased 
way. However, the renunciation of 
such mediating entities, which reduce 
the complexity of information by 
selection and evaluation, proved to be 
ambivalent, if not illusory. An increase 
of information in the political process 
involves new costs regarding the search, 
selection and evaluation of information 
and there are people who cannot or 
who do not want to bear these costs 
(Schrape 2010; Zittel 2009).
COMMUNICATION WITHOUT LIMITS
The Internet offers a wide range of 
communication possibilities from 
the purely written to sound-and-
image communication, from bilateral 
and group communication to mass 
communication of a »sender« to many 
»recipients«. Communication can take 
place across continents, regardless of 
time or as an immediate exchange 
of messages, in a comprehensible 
manner for direct participants only 
(i.e. in private) or in public. Typical 
of Internet communication – though 
not mandatory – is that there is no 
differentiation of the sender and 
recipient roles anymore and that 
intermediaries can be omitted as it 
is the case for mass communication 
transmitted by media.
Communication of politicians with 
their voters and citizens as well as 
with the public (transmitted by media) 
plays a very important role both 
regarding the self-conception and the 
time budget of the politicians (Riehm 
2010). Hopes placed in the various 
possibilities of Internet communication 
are directed towards an intensification 
of this communication relationship and 
towards the idea that citizens can get a 
more direct access to politics and that 
they can better prepare, coordinate 
and communicate their own political 
activities in the public.
However, some politicians are 
afraid of not being able to cope with 
communicative demands due to 
the new variety of communication 
possibilities and their wide availability. 
The citizens’ expectations regarding a 
dialog between citizens and politicians 
could be met only to a very limited 
extent for reasons of considerable 
workload. Thus, politicians focus less 
on a direct and equal communication 
relationship with the citizens than on a 
sender-dominated communication, e.g. 
in form of messages to specific lists of 
recipients (newsletters, mailing lists, 
Twitter and so on).
However, another concern is that 
specific and ever smaller population 
groups might be addressed in a very 
targeted way in terms of political direct 
marketing campaigns and thus that 
politics and powerful groups in society 
might have a considerably increasing 
potential for manipulation (Donk/Tops 
1992, p. 181 f.). Similarly, there are 
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Nfears that the Internet makes it easier 
for like-minded people to find each 
other, to organize themselves and to 
reinforce each other with regard to 
their views. This is considered to be 
particularly critical for democracy, if 
so-called »electronic tribes« (Hiltz/
Turoff 1978, p. 482 f.) pursue extremist 
and antidemocratic objectives. In 
this context, a balkanization of the 
electorate and »demographic ghettos« 
have been discussed as well (Donk/
Tops 1992, p. 181).
Finally, the explosion of informative 
and communicative possibilities 
involves excessive demands on society. 
Many people do not have the necessary 
resources regarding qualification and 
time to get involved in the »Internet 
community« (Grunwald et al. 2006) 
and there are strong indications that 
privileged groups of the population 
can benefit from cyberdemocracy to a 
much higher degree than the general 
public (already mentioned by Hiltz/
Turoff 1978, p. 167 ff.).
CONSULTATION AND PARTICIPATION
Political communication can be 
initiated by very different actors with 
regard to various topics and is only 
loosely connected to political processes 
in the strict sense, where appropriate. 
Political consultation, in contrast, 
generally is initiated by politics, 
focuses on a specific topic and is 
closely linked to political procedures. 
With regard to a legislative project or 
a political program, e.g. a ministry or 
parliamentary committee can invite 
associations, experts or citizens 
concerned who will answer given 
questions and who shall contribute 
their own expertise concerning the 
topic.
Participation procedures in a narrower 
sense are referred to, if there are 
particularly legal requirements – such 
as in urban and transport planning 
or for environmentally relevant large-
scale projects – which stipulate the 
involvement of the people concerned 
in the planning and decision-making 
process. Generally, these procedures 
are based on the fact that appropriate 
decisions require experience and 
expertise from society. By taking 
into consideration the different views 
of society for the decision-making 
process, politics or administration 
shall be better enabled to balance 
these different interests in terms of a 
common welfare. 
As these processes deal with the 
exchange of complex lines of reasoning 
in which more or less people are 
actively involved and which a broad 
public generally is interested in, the 
use of electronic group communication 
is an appropriate solution. This tool 
not only could support the current 
communication within the process, 
but also store the entire procedure 
and make sure that the data can 
be called up again at any time for 
subsequent evaluation. In the 1970s 
already, there have been experiments 
with such (purely text-based) computer 
conference systems which today can 
also integrate audio and video elements, 
of course.
Besides this information and trans-
parency function, hopes regarding 
electronic consultation and participation 
processes are also placed in a possible 
opening to the broad public. As a 
matter of principle, anyone could 
participate regardless of his/her status 
(egalitarian tendency of the Internet), 
his/her resources (only one Internet 
access is required) and his/her location 
(distances do not matter anymore). 
Another advantage of electronic 
consultation and participation 
procedures is seen in the fact that 
it is possible without major effort 
to provide the people involved with 
comprehensive procedural documents 
and opinions for the use of which an 
informed participation is expected. 
E-consultation and e-participation as 
integral parts of digital democracy are 
already used routinely to some extent, 
e.g. by the European Commission 
(Grunwald et al. 2006, p.  87 ff.) or 
by the Canadian government (Lindner 
2008).
Nevertheless, previous experiences 
have shown that the general opening 
of the procedures »to everyone« meets 
with a corresponding response under 
very specific conditions only and that 
only few people actively participate 
in the process (Grunwald et al. 2006, 
p. 15 and 21). Even more critical, 
however, seems to be that this type 
of procedure raises expectations 
regarding a substantial influence 
on political processes which in part 
already fail due to the fact that 
the opening and expansion of the 
»input channel« is not complemented 
by a corresponding expansion of 
processing capacities. This results in 
disappointment among citizens.
DECISIONS IN VOTES AND ELECTIONS
Democracy should not be understood 
merely as an act of electing repre-
sentatives at intervals of several years 
or as a vote in democratic bodies. The 
act of voting is preceded by election 
campaigns and majority decision 
is preceded by a substantial debate. 
Nevertheless, elections and majority 
votings are something like the 
culmination of democratic exertion of 
power. By means of these processes, 
changes in the political course become 
visible, laws are set and political 
programs are determined.
The (supposed) simplicity of the 
decision-making process – normally, 
it is about a decision between different 
alternatives or a choice between 
different persons – suggests the use 
of computer assistance. In the 1980s 
8

















N already, there were hopes for a more 
efficient process and – in view of 
increasing electoral fatigue on the part 
of the citizens – for an increased voter 
turn-out due to automated counting 
procedures. As a matter of principle, 
votes and elections can be conducted 
from anywhere. For proponents 
of direct democratic procedures, 
e-voting (Beckert 2011) offers better 
possibilities of being able to conduct 
more votes with relatively little effort 
and thus involving more citizens in real 
political decisions.
»Simple« votes in terms of a 
determination of public moods and 
opinions among the population and 
individual groups have become more 
or less accepted across the board. 
Particularly websites of newspapers 
and broadcasting companies offer such 
»polls« almost routinely. The electronic 
signing of appeals and petitions is a 
further, rather demonstrative than 
decision-relevant type of »vote« even 
if partly formal procedural privileges 
could be achieved via quorums. In 
contrast, there are only few electronic 
parliamentary elections and they exist 
only in a few countries. 
Here, it is feared that error-prone 
computer programs might produce 
wrong election results, that the 
anonymity of the electoral process 
might be endangered and that 
transparency of the ballot count 
of votes and elections might not be 
ensured anymore due to the »black 
box« characteristic of the computer. 
Moreover, there are warnings that the 
unity of debate and decision might be 
lost in favour of the mere act of voting. 
This danger was referred to as »push-
button democracy« by critics already 
20 years ago (Donk/Tops 1992, p. 170 
and 174 f.). Today, with a similarly 
critical intention, it is referred to as 
a reduction of political activities to 
»clicktivism« (Karpf 2010; Shulman 
2009; White 2010).
ELECTRONIC PETITIONS
In recent years, the Office of 
Technology Assessment at the German 
Bundestag (TAB) has done extensive 
research on the introduction and 
use of an electronic petition system 
(Riehm et al. 2009; TAB 2011). 
The German Bundestag provides 
for the possibility of petitions being 
submitted via the Internet and of 
publishing them on the e-petition 
platform of the German Bundestag 
at the request of the petitioners and 
following a specific authorization 
procedure. Further characteristics of 
the momentarily main e-participation 
project within the framework of the 
e-parliament strategy of the German 
Parliament are the possibilities of 
discussing petitions in an online 
forum and of collecting signatures 
supporting the respective petitions. 
When having reached a quorum of 
50,000 co-signatures, the Petitions 
Committee of the German Bundestag 
will hold a public Committee Meeting 
to which the petitioners are invited in 
order to bring forward their concerns 
in person and to answer the questions 
of the Members of the Bundestag.
This concrete parliamentary e-democ-
racy project also shows the typical 
patterns of the long-lasting debate 
about Internet and democracy.
The hopes of the initiators in the 
German Bundestag focused on a 
modernization of a very traditional 
right of political participation and on 
a political upgrading associated with 
that. The objective was to increase 
procedural transparency, to make 
the right to petition available to new 
groups of the population, to hear the 
pros and cons of a petition and, if 
appropriate, even to enter into a dialog 
with the citizens. Those hopes are 
shared by the citizens and petitioners 
who – according to surveys carried out 
by TAB – additionally have expected 
that their arguments submitted in the 
online forum would be considered in 
the petitions procedure.
However, exactly this point has 
been doubted by critics, because 
the formally weak position of the 
petitioners and of the Petitions 
Committee even with regard to the 
implementation of objectives which 
have been considered to be legitimate 
has remained unchanged. The fear 
that processing capacities cannot keep 
pace in case of an expansion of the 
»input channel« due to online forums 
has been confirmed by this example 
as well. The quite procedurally 
relevant contents of the discussion 
are integrated only unsystematically 
or sporadically into the procedures.
The fear that personal data are 
generated which might be used against 
the citizens is typical for the debate 
about e-democracy. Thus, in case 
of e-petitions, the names of the co-
signees are accessible to anyone on 
the Internet. Up to now, anonymous 
or pseudonymous forms for co-
signature are not admitted. However, 
there are also fears regarding the 
fact that the possibility of masking 
one’s own identity on the Internet 
might involve misuse or that groups 
and organizations which are well-
organized via the Internet might use 
the electronic petitions procedure for 
their political campaigns – for which 
it is not intended.
Unsurprisingly, the empirical studies 
carried out by TAB show a very 
differentiated picture. Altogether, 
the modernization of the German 
petitioning system by using the 
Internet has enhanced public 
awareness for this subject as well as 
its political significance. The citizens’ 
intentions of using it exceed by far 
the capacities which the German 
Bundestag can provide so that many 
public e-petitions cannot be admitted. 
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For some petitions, the discussion 
forums show a considerably high
level of participation with a generally 
good quality regarding the content. In 
fact, the use of the right to petition 
has been successfully extended to new 
groups of the population – particu-
larly to younger people. However, 
the composition of the group of 
petitioners still clings to the typical 
social pattern of a kind of political 
participation which is characterized 
by a higher level of education. The 
fears regarding misuse by organized 
campaigns, by groups which are well-
interconnected via online networks or 
by feigning false identities generally 
could not be confirmed.
CONCLUSION
The Internet provides an unimaginable 
degree of politically relevant infor-
mation as well as manifold possibilities 
of communication and participation 
in democratic processes. More trans-
parency and openness of the political 
system, opportunities for use which are 
independent of the social status as well 
of time and place are further typical 
hopes which have been expressed since 
the beginning of the debate about 
cyberdemocracy.
However, the debate also has been 
characterized by certain fears such as 
the danger of manipulation, censorship 
and surveillance, the social selectivity 
of use, excessive demands on the 
users in terms of information due to 
an elimination of mediating entities 
ensuring quality as well as certain 
opportunities for populist policy 
approaches. 
It is impossible to determine an 
unambiguous cycle of hopes, hypes 
and fears over the years. Right from the 
beginning, there have been both hopes 
in favour of the topic as well as critical 
fears. Even the scientific and empirical 
analysis of the development of Internet 
use in democracy is characterized by 
this ambivalence. How can this be 
explained?
First of all, one reason is a one-sided 
technologically deterministic question: 
Does »the Internet« represent a benefit 
or rather a menace to democracy? 
However, the Internet is not a hope 
or fear technology per se, but a 
technology which is shaped and can be 
further shaped. On the one hand, the 
question whether rather egalitarian or 
hierarchical forms of communication 
are promoted depends on the concrete 
technical implementation, on the 
corresponding types of use and on the 
embedding of Internet applications in 
society – and not on the »Internet« itself. 
On the other hand, the evaluation of 
specific properties of cyberdemocracy 
is also an issue of political basic 
concepts and interests. A proponent 
of direct democracy would consider 
the opportunities of e-voting rather 
to be a hope, whereas a proponent 
of representative democracy would 
rather consider them to be a danger. 
From the citizens’ perspective, the 
possibility of directly contacting 
politicians and political institutions 
is a benefit, but for the contacted 
people it is often not more than just 
an additional burden.
After 50 years of debates about 
and experience with Internet and 
democracy, we know definitely more 
about the concrete conditions under 
which the positive potentials can be 
realized rather than the negative ones. 
Technology assessment as well – which 
can look back on a similarly long 
history – has made its contribution 
to this development again and again.
Ulrich Riehm
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NThe still high expectations regarding nanotechnology are based on its potential of 
being able to generate material properties for completely new applications as well 
as to realize novel architectures and processes and to precisely adjust properties 
of macroscopic bodies by controlled assembly of these bodies from atomic and 
molecular components. For this reason, nanotechnology is expected to give new 
impetus for a wide range of socially relevant fields of application and innovations 
in almost all sectors of technology and industry. In information and communication 
technology (ICT), intensive work is being done on the development of new computer 
architectures which are intended to supersede conventional silicon electronics some 
day due to DNA and quantum computing. In power engineering, nanotechnology 
could give innovative impetus due to new materials. Novel nanoparticles could 
revolutionize chemical catalysis and production technologies. Finally, in medicine, 
nanobased therapeutics and carriers of active ingredients are being developed 
which can be positioned and dosed very precisely and which can escape immune 
defense or pass through the blood-brain barrier.
Due to its potential of fundamentally 
changing entire fields of technology 
(system innovation), nanotechnology is 
considered to be a key technology which 
might entail considerable economic, 
ecological and social consequences in 
the (near) future. Already more than 
one decade ago, the nanotechnology 
expert and Nobel laureate in Chemistry 
Richard E. Smalley described the 
consequences to be expected as 
follows (Smalley 1999): »The impact of 
nanotechnology on health, wealth, and 
the standard of living for people will be 
at least the equivalent of the combined 
influences of microelectronics, medical 
imaging, computer-aided engineering, 
and man-made polymers in this 
century.« Although this evaluation 
is rather speculative in part, it even 
then was based on the observation 
and analysis of tangible research and 
development activities.
VISIONS OF SALVATION AND 
HORROR
There are different visionary ideas 
which are significant particularly 
because they often dominate(d) the 
public awareness of nanotechnology 
and because they have been and still 
are discussed both in the feature pages 
and among experts. These visions are 
taking the next step. They are based 
on the idea that it will be possible in 
the future to manipulate matter at 
will and to assemble atom by atom 
and molecule by molecule according 
to one’s own wishes. It is obvious that 
– depending on the personal point 
of view – this evokes either visions 
of salvation (»hope«) or visions of 
horror (»fear«). Though he often was 
considered to be a scientific outsider, 
it was first and foremost the American 
technology visionary K.E. Drexler with 
his »Foresight Institute« who initiated 
such discussions and who coined the 
term of »molecular nanotechnology« 
for his – predominantly optimistic – 
vision of the future regarding artificial, 
bacteria-like, self-replicating, intelligent 
nanomachines (»assemblers«) (Drexler 
1986; Drexler/Peterson 1994). 
Moreover, his nanofuturistic visions 
prognosticated massive transformations 
of society and of the »conditio humana« 
due to nanotechnology. On the other 
hand, he – just like B. Joy (2000) – 
developed explicit horror scenarios 
regarding the extinction of all life e.g. 
due to self-replicating nanomachines 
which got out of control. In turn, 
this type of nanofuturism is part of a 
comprehensive and visionary ideology 
with regard to technology which mostly 
is referred to as »transhumanism« 
(Coenen 2010).
At the same time, these visions of 
Drexler, Joy and other futurists and 
technology visionaries are mainly based 
on assumptions concerning the future 
interactions of several new (or already 
known) technologies (for this, please also 
refer to A. Sauter’s article on Synthetic 
Biology). Such visions of the convergence 
of different technologies are the drivers 
of hopes regarding extensive and far-
reaching changes to the conditions 
of human existence. From this 
perspective, even on an administrative 
level, nanotechnology is considered 
to be an multidisciplinary element of 
interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary 
research and development and a 
convergence of nanotechnology with 
biotechnology, information technology, 
engineering sciences and further fields 
of technology is propagated under 
the name »Converging Technologies« 
(BMU 2010).
The enthusiasm which can be generated 
particularly by optimistic futuristic 
visions was used deliberately for 
example in the United States at the 
beginning of the 21st century in order 
to promote technology development. 
However, such a »hope and hype« 
strategy is always precarious. Besides 
the positive effects of this strategy 
(e.g. incentives for young scientists or 
arousing and sustaining political and 
commercial interest), there are also 
possible negative impacts: Thus, on 
the one hand, there is the danger that 
expectations of nanotechnology will be 
set too high, making disappointment 
inevitable. On the other hand, it might 
popularize the reverse of optimistic 
futurism – a pessimistic futurism 
involving apocalyptic fears and visions 
of horror. For this reason, a critical 
approach to these visions of horror, 
even if this initially makes them even 
more popular, would be an important 
contribution to a rational discussion 
which does justice to the problems of 
the potential – positive and negative – 
of nanotechnology (TAB 2008). 
NANOTECHNOLOGY:
SMALL PARTS – GREAT FUTURE?
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N WHAT IS NANOTECHNOLOGY?
The American physicist and Nobel 
laureate Richard Feynman, who died in 
1988, gave nanotechnology its name and 
therefore is considered to be its »founder«. 
In 1959 already, he prognosticated the 
technical opportunities of the nanoscale 
in a lecture (»There’s plenty of room at 
the bottom«) and described the vision of 
assembling at the atomic level (»arrange 
the atoms one by one the way we want 
them«). Feynman (1959) assumed that 
there is no physical law excluding the 
possibility of moving individual atoms. 
According to that, it should be possible 
to manipulate matter at the atomic level. 
Thus, it should be possible e.g. to store 
the entire »Encyclopedia Britannica« on 
one grain of dust, if each atom would 
carry one bit. However, the atomic 
characters could be read only by means 
of a »super electron microscope«. This 
was presented 30 years later (1990) by 
D. Eigler and E. Schweizer of IBM 
Germany to the surprised press by means 
of an electron micrograph: 35 xenon 
atoms on a nickel substrate built the name 
»IBM« (Steinmüller 2006, p. 78).
The term »nanotechnology« itself was 
used for the first time in the 1970s by the 
Japanese researcher and engineer Norio 
Taniguchi. He described operating 
and manufacturing methods having 
a precision in the nanometer range. 
Precisely this fact – the technological 
control of the atomic and molecular 
dimension – is the actual new and 
particular thing about nanotechnology 
and offers the opportunity to optimize 
product properties in almost all 
sectors of the economy such as e.g. 
in power engineering, environmental 
engineering, information technology, 
in medical engineering as well as 
in the field of health and nutrition 
(VDI 2010, p. 19). Since the term 
»nanotechnology« was established, it 
has undergone changes again and again 
(Decker 2006). The term is mostly 
used for different scientific areas of 
research and technological lines of 
development which primarily have one 
thing in common: They are dealing 
with structures and processes on the 
nanometer scale. 
First of all, »nano« – derived from the 
Greek word »nanos« meaning »dwarf« 
– refers to size. Nanotechnology 
deals with dimensions sized from 
approximately 1 to 100 nanometers 
(nm) with 1 nm being a billionth of a 
meter (1 nm = 10-9 m). To formulate it 
precisely: If a football would be shrunk 
to a sphere with a diameter of 1 nm, 
the degree of miniaturization would 
correspond to shrinking the globe to the 
size of a football. Thus, the dimension 
of nanotechnology ranges from the 
size of an atom approximately to the 
wavelength of visible light. Those 
are the dimensions in which basic 
biochemical and molecular-biological 
processes are taking place. Moreover, it 
marks a threshold where the behaviour 
of matter cannot be described only with 
the laws of classical physics anymore. 
Quantum effects occur increasingly: 
»Atoms stick to each other. Particles 
tunnel through potential barriers, 
which actually are impenetrable for 
them, and cannot be distinguished from 
each other anymore. Light turns around 
the corner and takes on a granular 
structure« (Steinmüller 2006, p. 77).
Thus, nanotechnology not only 
deals with tiny objects, but it also is 
characterized by using specific effects 
which (only) occur in these dimensions. 
Regardless of the reference to size, 
there is a tendency of subsuming a 
multitude of already established and 
new processes as a general term for 
a multitude of technologies dealing 
with structures and processes on the 
nanometer scale mentioned. This range 
will be achieved both by the use of new 
physical instruments and procedures 
via a further miniaturization of 
current microsystems and by the use 
of construction plans of animate 
and inanimate nature for the self-
organizing assembly of matter. 
RESEARCH POLICY ACTIVITIES – 
MUCH »HOPE«
Of course, research policy also focuses 
(and focused) on »nano«. A reference 
to the potentials of nanotechnologies is 
a »must« for every political statement 
regarding technologies of the future. 
Since the end of the 1980s already, 
research policy has increasingly adopted 
the term »nanotechnology«. Since 
that time, it was the basis of manifold 
research activities particularly in the 
United States resulting in a first climax 
in 1999 with the launch of the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) 
which was announced and publicly 
promoted by the former President 
Clinton referring to Feynman’s 
»vision« (Böl et al. 2010). Since the 
end of the 1990s, the development 
and establishment of nanotechnology 
as a key technology is promoted and 
funded by immense governmental 
funding programs in all high-tech 
regions worldwide. Every state that 
aims at boosting national cutting-
edge research activities is intensively 
promoting this area of research. 
In Germany, a comprehensive political 
program of action for nanotechnology 
has been formulated since the 
beginning of the 21st century by the 
government, but also by different 
initiatives of the German Bundestag. 
Among other things, this program 
has generated different frameworks 
for action and initiatives, manifold 
discourses, dialogs and communication 
platforms under participation of 
science, industry, government, 
associations and the public. Moreover, 
it has advanced the promotion of 
various projects regarding security 
research and provided for continuous 
status quo reports (TAB 2009). In 




















of nanotechnology for Germany in a 
strategically comprehensive way and 
to adapt them for use in tangible 
applications, the »Action Plan 2010« 
was implemented in the middle of 
the decade and it was followed by 
the »Action Plan Nanotechnology 
2015« at the end of the decade. This 
Action Plan is intended to serve as a 
»common platform for a successful and 
sustainable use of nanotechnology in 
all its aspects« (BMBF 2010). In view 
of research promotion, regulation and 
health care, the European Union also 
intends to adopt a new action plan in 
2011 which shall define strategies until 
2015. Within the EU’s 7th Framework 
Programme for Research alone which 
will be running until 2013, subsidies of 
much more than 1 billion Euros have 
been spent on nanotechnology up to 
now (BMBF 2010). 
In Germany, nanotechnologies are 
funded by the public authorities with 
approximately 500 million Euros 
per year. The largest part of funds 
is contributed by the BMBF (Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research) 
which supports a large network of centers 
of excellence, e.g. for nanoanalysis, 
nanomaterials, nanoelectronics, 
nanooptics, nanobiotechnology, nano-
chemistry, ultrathin layers as well as 
molecular architectures and many 
others more. With a research quota 
of 14 % (R&D expenditure in 
relation to total sales), the sector of 
nanotechnologies currently is one of 
the most researchintensive technology 
areas in Germany. At the international 
level, there are signs of a neck-and-neck 
competition. The European Union, the 
United States and Japan are investing 
public funds of approximately 1 billion 
Euros each year in nanotechnologies. 
Adding expenditure of industry and 
of other important states (France, the 
United Kingdom, Korea, China, Russia), 
the total amount worldwide is likely to 
be considerably higher than 5 billion 
Euros per year (BMBF 2010; German 
Federal Government 2010; VDI 2010).
MARKET OPPORTUNITIES AND 
HOPES – MUCH »HYPE«
On the world markets, nanotechnology 
opens up (hopes for) new opportunities 
due to smaller, faster, more efficient and 
more intelligent system components for 
new products with novel or improved 
functionalities. There are several 
evaluations by market research institutes 
which try to quantify the »leverage 
effect« of nanotechnology by taking into 
consideration global market potentials 
of nano-optimized products. Due to 
the international interdependence of the 
markets, however, a regional localization 
is almost impossible. The sales in 
nanotechnology generated worldwide 
by companies located in Germany were 
estimated to be 33 billion Euros in 2007 
(German Federal Government 2010, 
p. 12). Meanwhile, in Germany alone, 
almost 1,000 companies are working 
on the development, manufacturing 
and marketing of nanotechnological 
products and processes, approximately 
80 % among them being small and 
mediumsized companies. More than 
60,000 industry jobs depend on the use 
of nanotechnologies and nanomaterials 
(BMU 2010). 
However, an exact specification of the 
market volume of products containing 
nanomaterials is impossible due to 
the transdisciplinary character of 
nanotechnology and due to the fact that 
it is very difficult to restrict the term 
»nano« to specific areas. Moreover, 
the corresponding »marketing 
departments« have long realized that 
the »nano« label means »hype«. Thus, 
the »nano« label is quickly given to 
all products which are provided 
with e.g. ultrafine or generally tiny 
particles and the surface of which has 
a sort of finer structure. Irrespective 
of general inaccuracies, market 
researchers assume that currently the 
market volume worldwide equals to 
100 or even several 100 billion Euros 
with the trend of further increasing 
considerably (VDI 2010). Thus, 
already for 2015, the intersectoral 
market volume worldwide which can 
be influenced by nanotechnology is 
estimated to more than 1,000 billion 
Euros (BMBF 2010). Thus, in 2015, the 
market potential of nanotechnology 
On the international level, it has not been possible yet to find a concluding 
concretization of the rather diffuse »definition« of nanotechnology. Among 
other things, there are different opinions regarding criteria of demarca-
tion such as e.g. the size of nano-objects and functional properties which 
have been modified by the miniaturization of structures, layers and objects. 
Germany is involved continuously in international discussions aiming at the 
development of a definition (EU commission, CEN, OECD, ISO) which is 
homogeneously manageable worldwide (German Federal Government 2010). 
As »interim solution«, mostly the definitions laid down by the Technical 
Committee 229 of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
are quoted (BMU 2010):
> Nano-objects: Materials with one, two or three external dimensions 
in the nanoscale (approx. 1 to 100 nm). Nano-objects typically include 
nanoparticles, nanoplates and nanofibres, the latter comprising electrical-
ly conducting fibres (nanowires), nanotubes and solid nanorods. 
> Nanostructured materials: These materials have an internal structure in 
the nanoscale and generally occur as compound systems of nano-objects 
(e.g. aggregates and agglomerates). In this case, however, they are not 
limited in their physical size or shape (according to ISO).
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N would correspond to approximately 
15 % of the industrial goods market. 
This would mean that a large part of 
the global production of goods, e.g. in 
the fields of chemistry, pharmaceutics, 
food, packaging, ICT, automotive and 
mechanical engineering as well as in 
energy and environmental engineering 
would be based on the application of 
nanotechnological know-how (VDI 
2010, p. 34). However, such estimates 
are rather speculative, particularly 
because most product analyses do 
not evaluate only the »nano« share of 
the product (e.g. in case of »suntan 
lotion«, the full price of the bottles 
is taken as a basis for calculation 
instead of only the share of titanium 
dioxide nanoparticles). Furthermore, 
not all products labelled »nano« really 
contain »nano«. But even according to 
conservative (or traceable) estimates, 
nanotechnology actually shall play 
a role for approximately 10 % of all 
goods by the middle of the decade 
(Steinmüller 2006, p. 76).
PUBLIC AWARENESS AND RISK 
DISCOURSES – MORE »FEAR«
While, on the one hand, nanotechnology 
is praised as the key technology of the 
21st century which is said to be able 
even to help fight the climate change, 
diseases and the world food problem, 
a closer look on it – e.g. on products 
being available on the market up to 
now – reveals a rather sobering picture: 
Though a multitude of everyday 
products enters the market, these 
products often have no distinct benefit 
or added value. Moreover, particularly 
the highly praised breakthroughs e.g. 
regarding resource conservation for 
manufacturing, consumption as well 
as for environmental technology in 
general are a long time coming.
At the same time, fundamental 
questions – e.g. that for potential 
risks – still remain unanswered: 
Nanostructures can be released into 
the environment, for example due to 
emissions in production or due to the 
use of respective products. Neither for 
shorter nor for longer periods of time, 
the potential consequences for humans 
and the environment are sufficiently 
known. Moreover, they have constituted 
a corresponding risk discourse. Indeed, 
politics (in Germany) focused on a 
distinct impact assessment as well as 
on a social and political support of this 
technology at an early stage in order to 
safeguard the interests of the economy 
and of consumers: Comprehensive 
research programs have been launched, 
new scientific institutes have been 
founded, common commissions of 
different groups of actors have been 
established and numerous public forums 
for dialog have been initiated (German 
Federal Government 2010, p. 12 f.). 
Nevertheless, it is not possible yet to 
make any unambiguous statements 
based on current scientific knowledge 
with regard to the question of which 
nanomaterials in which configuration 
might entail specific risks for humans 
and the environment. Particularly the 
possible inhalation of dust containing 
nanomaterials which is stable in a 
biological environment is associated 
with increased risks to health, because 
these dust particles might penetrate to 
the pulmonary alveoli and – in case 
of biological stability – might involve 
inflammations and chronic diseases 
(even cancer). 
Besides the risk discourse related 
to health, the (necessary) discourse 
on nanotechnologies also includes 
fundamental ethical and social 
issues, e.g. regarding privacy and 
data protection aspects in view of 
increasingly efficient methods for 
sensor-based monitoring as well 
as of the collection, storage and 
transmission of medical and/or lifestyle 
data using nano-based products and 
processes. Also, bioethical aspects play 
a role, in particular with regard to 
interventions in the human organism, 
for individualized medicine as well 
as for fundamental questions on the 
image of humanity and on the man-
machine relationship (Grunwald 2008), 
which could become relevant due to the 
application of nanotechnology. It is of 
decisive importance to scientifically 
reflect these issues and to discuss them 
in public in order to develop adequate 
solutions and to be able to present new 
perspectives. Here, it is important to 
evaluate both risk issues and ethical 
aspects in the context of the respective 
fields of application, because focusing 
solely on the scale of nanotechnology is 
not a reasonable criterion for a specific 
evaluation of this field of technology 
(BMBF 2010, p. 35).
Altogether, it can be stated that – at a 
relatively early stage – accompanying 
research in the fields of social sciences 
and the humanities also has been 
understood as an essential »partner 
for discourse« against the background 
of the development of nanotechnology 
as a key technology which has been 
recognized as such very early. Though, 
first of all, the focus has been on socio-
economic aspects, very shortly social, 
ethical and legal implications in a 
broader sense have come to the fore as 
well (Coenen 2010; TAB 2008). In this 
process, which has been pushed not only 
by science, but also – particularly in the 
United States – by research managers 
and even politics, a rather traditional 
understanding of scientific and risk 
communication (initially) prevailed. 
Here, first of all, the objective was to 
inform people about nanotechnologies 
focusing on the opportunities they offer 
(Böl et al. 2010, p. 14). As a counterpart 
particularly of nanofuturistic visions 
(of horror) (e.g. Joy 2000), namely 
the far-reaching expectations of 
possible opportunities were used in the 
communication with the public in many 
cases and very intensively through 
transmission by the media. This, in turn, 



















NIn general, the interactions as well as 
the contrast of expectations and the 
real perception of benefits are obvious. 
Finally, it is exactly this interaction which 
can strongly influence the (further) line 
of development and implementation of a 
field of technology. »Consumer decisions 
can represent the critical corrective with 
regard to exaggerated expectations. At 
the same time, exaggerated expectations 
might make consumers suspicious of an 
entire research area and consequently 
might prevent investors from contributing 
to its further development.« (Böl et al. 
2010, p. 15).
INNOVATION CULTURE – 
PRAGMATIC MANAGEMENT OF 
RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES
As surveys show, in the middle of 
the past decade, the majority of the 
European citizens initially considered 
nanotechnologies as generally 
beneficial to society and not as 
particularly risky. Correspondingly, 
according to Eurobarometer 
surveys, the majority was in favour 
of promoting nanotechnologies 
(Gaskell et al. 2006). Recent empirical 
studies on risk perception regarding 
nanotechnology make the concern of 
a general rejection of nanotechnology 
by the population appear rather 
unfounded as well. The result of a 
representative survey of the population 
concerning risk perception (Zimmer 
et al. 2008) was that two thirds of the 
respondents expect nanotechnology 
to offer more benefits than risks and 
that there are positive expectations 
particularly with regard to medical 
applications. However, it has to be 
taken into consideration here that many 
respondents comment on opportunities 
and risks of nanotechnology though 
many studies from numerous countries 
reveal that they have only little or 
even no knowledge at all regarding 
this technology (von Rosenbladt et 
al. 2007; Siegrist et al. 2007). At the 
public immediately and very critically. 
At the same time, another aspect of 
the nanotechnology discourse was the 
concern whether strongly exaggerated 
expectations might arise with regard to 
nanotechnology and necessarily might 
be followed by disappointments e.g. 
against the background of extremely 
far-reaching (positive) visions (i.a. 
Roco/Bainbridge 2002), which had 
been developed in a strategy of »hype 
and hope« particularly in the United 
States (Paschen et al. 2004). 
As things developed, it became 
obvious that the political and scientific 
discussions on nanotechnology mainly 
focused on the concern that the public or 
finally the consumers could respond to 
the newly implemented key technology 
with similar fears concerning risks 
and thus with rejection as it already 
was the case with some subareas of 
biotechnology and genetic engineering 
(e.g. green genetic engineering, cloning). 
Thus, there was the concern – e.g. due 
to repeated and insistent warnings by 
some non-governmental organizations, 
mainly by the ETC (2006) – »that 
with regard to the perception of risk, 
imaginable impacts on health and the 
environment might entail a general 
rejection of nanotechnology« (Böl et 
al. 2010, p. 15). It could be illustrated 
by several studies that such a concern 
was not generally unfounded and 
that, for this reason, a transparent 
and differentiating discussion and 
provision of information regarding 
nanotechnology and the resulting 
specific production processes, products 
and applications is required (Fleischer 
et al. 2010). 
Particularly against the background of 
nanomaterials being increasingly used 
in consumer-near products and of an 
increasing and stronger exposition 
of employees, consumers and the 
environment becoming probable, 
consumers meanwhile are evaluating 
the fields of application in a very 
differentiated way and are calling for an 
explicit labelling. In particular in view of 
a distribution of nanotechnology-based 
everyday products such as cosmetics, 
cleaning agents, clothes and household 
articles, the aspects of food safety and 
consumer protection are becoming 
more and more significant (Fleischer/
Quendt 2007). However, in Germany 
and also in Europe, information about 
the use of nanomaterials in products 
is not (uniformly) regulated by law, 
but to date mostly depends on the 
decision of the product manufacturer. 
Thus, in Europe, e.g. the labelling of 
nanoscale components in cosmetics 
will be mandatory only as of 2013 
(BMBF 2010, p. 29). Nevertheless, 
particularly the areas of food and 
health are considered to be those fields 
of application which are most likely 
to be hit by controversies. Moreover, 
it has to be assumed that the way 
the relevant actors are dealing with 
consumers’ needs for information 
and safety will significantly influence 
the attitudes and perceptions of the 
consumers (Böl et al. 2010; Sigrist et al. 
2007). In Germany, Great Britain and 
in Switzerland, this could be identified 
within the framework of several public 
dialog procedures and consumer 
conferences. According to Möller et al. 
(2009, p. 110), the following relevant 
demands made by consumers can be 
stated in detail:
> labelling in order to allow an 
informed choice of products and 
to avoid that consumers are misled 
with regard to products;
> active information policy 
concerning research projects and 
initiation of public debates;
> more comprehensive risk research, 
risk prevention and corresponding 
measures of risk management;
> authorization procedures for 
nanoscale substances in food or 
additional assessment of already 
authorized substances in case they 
are nanoscale.
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N same time – just as it has been shown 
– in many cases there was a lack of 
specific knowledge concerning the risks 
of nanotechnology in production and 
application and many governments and 
authorities in charge arranged to think 
more intensively than before not only 
about possible consequences of using 
this technology, but also to envisage 
tangible measures for regulation and 
prevention.
It is unquestionable that – with 
regard to managing these issues – a 
responsible assessment of the risks and 
opportunities involved is required for 
both individuals and society as a whole 
and that corresponding discourses have 
to be conducted in a transparent, public 
and continuous way. Besides such 
debates – which refer to concrete aspects 
of nanomaterials and nanoproducts 
as well as to possible consequences 
for humans and the environment – 
several activities and discussions can be 
identified in the context of discourses 
and accompanying forums of cultural, 
political and social sciences as well as 
of the humanities which, for example, 
are dealing with the question of which 
possibilities exist in society to develop 
and to implement an »innovation 
culture« in a field of technology such 
as nanotechnologies (Kahan et al. 
2009). Such an innovation culture 
includes e.g. discursive development 
and establishment of general 
concepts which are committed to 
the principles of sustainability and/
or socio-ecological prevention. 
Correspondingly, the necessary and 
politically desirable intention would 
be to achieve a reasonable degree of 
»orientation« as well as a »reduced 
complexity« of the technology field 
with regard to society’s perception. In 
terms of a »dialogical development of a 
general concept«, this might contribute 
to reducing uncertainties regarding 
possible opportunities, risks, successes 
and failures in the development 
and application of innovative key 
technologies, to removing unnecessary 
obstacles to an establishment of the 
technology or to prevent an inadequate 
»hype« as well as an exaggerated 
»technology push« resulting from that. 
Finally, it is about a changed 
understanding of the role (e.g. and 
also of cultural aspects) of science (or 
its methods used for gaining knowledge) 
in society and a stronger integration 
of this (new) understanding in politics. 
From the perspective of a participatory 
approach for discourse, the »evaluations 
of lay people based on real-life would 
no longer have to be considered as an 
expression of lacks of knowledge to 
overcome« and »the driving forces 
of scientific and technical progress 
would have to be analyzed thoroughly 
and by abandoning traditional 
conceptualizations« (Böl et al. 2010, 
p. 14). In recent years, these opinions or 
findings have developed increasingly in 
Europe as well – following the example 
of the United States. Correspondingly, 
this has been reflected in the public’s 
perception of nanotechnology and 
in the discussions with regard to its 
public perception. Here, it has become 
apparent, among other things, that 
the cultural, political and ideological 
attitudes of the (respective) population 
essentially co-determine the perception 
of risks and opportunities as well 
as the – even political – evaluation 
of nanotechnology (Currall 2009; 
Fleischer et al. 2010; Kahan et al. 2009). 
In contrast to the United States (and 
partly to other European countries) 
where nanotechnology was and still is 
politically communicated within a rather 
technophile framework (TAB 2008), the 
German policy approach represented 
by the German Federal Government’s 
»Nano Kommission« is focusing on the 
precautionary principle as well as on 
sustainability and environmental aspects 
(BMU 2010) – aspects which have been 
of particular importance in society and 
politics for quite some time now. Thus, 
largely shared cultural and political 
influences are followed up – without 
neglecting the issue of innovation 
(Grunwald 2008). Altogether, this 
corresponds to a constructive approach 
for discourse with the objective of giving 
a »hope, hype and fear technology« a 
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N Synthetic biology currently represents a prime example of a »hope, hype and fear 
technology«. On the one hand, it has a close methodological connection with 
genetic engineering while, on the other hand, being close to nanotechnology 
and converging technologies in discursive terms. Even though there is as yet no 
consensus about the essence and prospects of synthetic biology, it is regarded 
by many as the key direction in which developments are heading in biosciences 
– with the latter being seen in turn as the defining science of the 21st century, 
following in the footsteps of physics in the 19th century and chemistry in 
the 20th. This paper will show that a certain discrepancy can be identified 
between the extent of the expectations, hopes and fears under discussion 
and the available fund of knowledge or of specifically foreseeable potential 
applications.
One characteristic feature of hope, 
hype and fear technologies, without 
doubt, is that every debate about 
it is preceded by a discussion of 
its definition or whether there is a 
common understanding of what it 
means. Although this seems absolutely 
inevitable with a new technology or a 
new branch of science, the question 
about definitions and understanding 
has a different meaning in the three 
examples of nanotechnology (central 
theme of paper by C. Revermann), 
converging technologies (TAB 2008) 
and synthetic biology: that is because 
the question is whether the current 
status of knowledge, data and 
technology allows a new, discrete field 
to be assumed – or whether this is just 
a relabelling of incremental progress 
or a new name for something long 
familiar.
IN SEARCH OF A COMMON 
UNDERSTANDING
Almost every paper which addresses 
the prospects, opportunities and 
risks of synthetic biology reflects and 
comments on what differentiates it 
from a mere further development of 
genetic engineering – which for its part 
can be very well demarcated because 
the targeted modification of naturally 
occurring DNA can be defined as the 
intersection of all genetic engineering 
applications.
The understanding which forms the 
basis for the current TAB project on 
synthetic biology has been defined 
as follows (http://www.tab-beim-
bundestag.de/en/research/u9800.
html): »Synthetic biology is the 
designation for a field at the interface 
of biology, chemistry, biotechnology, 
engineering science, and information 
technology. It is based on findings 
and methods from molecular and 
systems biology, in particular the 
decoding of entire genomes and 
the technological advances in the 
synthesis and analysis of nucleic acids. 
The idea underlying synthetic biology 
is the creation of new biological 
systems that do not occur as such in 
nature and the design of individual 
molecules, cells and organisms that 
exhibit new properties with the aid 
of procedures from molecular biology 
and standardised principles and 
methods from engineering science. 
In doing this, different strategies are 
being followed:
> Mechanical, synthetic production 
and sequencing of DNA
> Synthesis of protocells with the 
properties of living cells with the 
aid of biochemical substances 
lacking a concrete biological model
> Construction of minimal cells with 
synthetically produced genomes
> Integration of artificial biochemical 
systems in living organisms to 
achieve new properties
> Construction of chemical systems 
(new biomolecules) corresponding 
to biological models such that these 
systems manifest certain properties 
of living organisms
> Reduction of organisms to rudi-
mentary system components by 
installing standardised modular 
biological parts (›BioBricks‹) for 
the purpose of creating biological 
circuits that respond to external 
stimuli«
This description deliberately avoids an 
advance positioning on the news value 
of synthetic biology and serves as a 
starting point so that, as a result of 
the systematic capture of application 
potentials and risks, it is even possible 
to discuss whether the term and 
content are really forward-looking and 
relevant, i.e. whether there is even a 
cause for hope and fear.
The antipole to such a position which 
is initially about searching is formed 
by those who understand or postulate 
the creation of »artificial life« as the 
core goal of synthetic biology and 
place it at the centre of the debate. 
This almost inevitably gives rise to 
the question of the legitimacy of 
»playing God« as a metaphor for 
the philosophical and theological 
discussion of necessary and desirable 
limits on human action when 
interacting with nature. »Synthetic 
biology shifts human interaction 
with nature from the paradigm of 
manipulation to that of creation,« 
write, for example, Boldt et al. 
(2009, p. 80); »Vom Veränderer zum 
Schöpfer« (From modifier to creator) 
is the title of a paper by the Director 
of the TAB (Grunwald 2010a). Similar 
formulations have been used since the 
emergence of genetic engineering in 
the 1970s for almost every important 
biomedical development (prenatal and 
pre-implantation diagnosis, cloning, 
stem cell use), and they reliably 
generated public attention, though 
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Nof new technical options without any 
fundamental strategic importance – 
along the lines of the International 
Genetically Engineered Machine 
competition, iGEM (http://ung.
igem.org), set up by Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) and 
run annually since 2003 in which 
groups of students vie for the most 
original and forward-looking 
projects using BioBricks. Perhaps the 
greatest consensus among scientists 
working in this field could be that 
the methods brought together under 
the synthetic biology label constitute 
a gain in knowledge in basic research, 
particularly with reference to the 
functioning of genes and genomes 
but also of other molecules and 
cell components without direct 
applications having necessarily to 
result from them.
HYPE: »LEBEN 3.0« AND – YET 
AGAIN – SAVING THE WORLD
Hype – i.e. an exaggerated 
expectation of the future potential 
– can only accompany spectacular 
scientific successes which are easily 
communicable to the wider community 
in the case of synthetic biology 
to a limited extent. The primary 
opportunity for dramatisation is the 
image of the artificial production of 
life in the laboratory – which, even 
though it can hardly withstand serious 
scrutiny, has a centuries-old tradition 
to call on. It is no surprise on the one 
hand, therefore, that a clear interest 
has developed in the humanities and 
arts for an interdisciplinary debate on 
the potential significance of synthetic 
biology (e.g. the proceedings of the 
»Leben 3.0 and die Zukunft der 
Evolution« [Life 3.0 and the Future 
of Evolution] conference of the Berlin-
Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and 
Humanities in cooperation with the 
Berlin Medical Historical Museum 
of the Charité University Hospital on 
this is mainly characterised by fear 
and less by hope (see below).
And how could hype arise? Where 
can these exaggerated hopes come 
from? The easiest way to explain 
these is to select a third perspective 
on the issue of synthetic biology, i.e. 
the assumption of the systematic and 
synergistic merging of biomedical 
and engineering developments 
in what are termed converging 
technologies (Coenen et al. 2009; 
TAB 2008). »Biology is becoming 
technology« and »Technology is 
becoming biology« – according to 
the »Making Perfect Life« project of 
the European Technology Assessment 
Group these are two megatrends 
which will shape our technical and 
economic future (ETAG 2010). Based 
on this assessment there is a clear 
assumption that synthetic biology is 
positively predestined to be the key 
technology for resolving mankind’s 
future problems because it unites all 
the major technologies.
Overall it may be assumed, both in 
the case of synthetic biology and also 
for other technological developments, 
that the extent of hope, hype and 
fear is greatly influenced by the 
chosen perspective and the resulting 
preoccupation with the potentials. 
The considerations outlined below 
are intended to substantiate three 
assumptions relating to synthetic 
biology:
> To date there have been – sur-
prisingly – few hopes in the sense 
of target applications, or they have 
been far from specific.
> Exaggerations mainly accompany 
the topos of the creation of artificial 
life – and have less impact than 
might be expected.
> For various reasons the fears 
that could be mobilised have 
been contained to date within 
comparatively tight limits.
HOPE: IMPROVED MICROBES 
AND DIVERSE ACQUISITION OF 
KNOWLEDGE
The same applications for synthetic 
biology are repeatedly cited as the future 
prospect (e.g. in the overview studies 
on the potentials of synthetic biology 
in box 2): bioenergy and raw materials 
production with optimised or »newly 
designed« microorganisms, biosensors 
for environmental monitoring and 
medical diagnostics and various 
strategies for the manufacture of 
pharmaceuticals and new therapy and 
vaccine variants.
However, a precise analysis of the 
applications concretely pursued and 
developed a little further to date, 
such as took place at a workshop of 
the Engineering Life project (www.
engineeringlife.de) (König et al. 2011) 
which is sponsored by the BMBF 
(Germany’s Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research) reveals 
that practically no or scarcely any 
example can be identified which 
cannot be regarded as a mere further 
development of molecular biological 
and genetic engineering methods which 
have been in use for some time – or 
vice versa that qualitatively delimitable 
approaches, such as the comprehensive 
»construction« and »implementation« 
of new metabolic pathways in bacteria 
or yeasts or even the complete de novo 
design of microorganisms, currently 
still constitute basic research without 
any certainty of technical feasibility 
and utility.
With reference to synthetic biology, 
therefore, it is particularly relevant 
to ask whether the current status 
of research is really such that it is 
possible to talk of a new development 
stage in applied biosciences or even 
a paradigm shift. Many scientists 
regard synthetic biology to date more 
as an almost playful, experimental use 
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N 16/17 September 2010; Gerhardt et al. 
2011) and, on the other hand, that the 
visual arts are addressing the issue, 
especially through the medium of the 
cinema (such as in May of this year in 
Vienna at Bio:Fiction, the world’s first 
film festival devoted to this theme; 
www.bio-fiction.com).
Some scientists are presenting the 
complete synthesis of genomes, i.e. the 
central genetic information of a cell 
or organism, as the current variant of 
creating life. Following the successful 
sequencing of the genomes of three 
viruses – including the reconstructed 
virus of the Spanish flu of 1918 – by 
2005, scientists from the laboratories 
of Craig Venter, probably the greatest 
media star among genome researchers, 
reported the complete synthesis of a 
bacterium genome which is many 
times greater (see Schummer 2011 in 
relation to this and the following). The 
to date greatest public sensation was 
generated by a press release from the 
J. Craig Venter Institute in May 2010 
which stated that scientists had created 
the first synthetic, self-reproducing 
bacterium cell. As Joachim Schummer 
emphasises in his book »The Craft 
of Gods: The Artificial Creation 
of Life in the Laboratory«, the 
press release contains an unusually 
detailed exposition of the scientific 
methodology which, in conjunction 
with a superficial reading of the 
related scientific paper, would have 
made clear that this is nothing to do 
with a de novo creation of life in the 
laboratory, but merely a further step 
in the use of large DNA molecules and 
a targeted manipulation of bacterium 
cells. At the same time, however, the 
message of the »synthetic genome« 
and the »synthetic cell« was declared 
so prominently and further hyped in 
interviews that artificial life was the 
media message that emerged after all 
(Schummer 2011, p. 113 ff.). This also 
occurs as a result of people equating 
»synthetic cell« with »artificial cell« 
(i.e. without a natural paradigm) in 
everyday speech. Interestingly, the 
religious implication in the sense of 
»playing God« occurred almost only 
in Catholic- and Hindu-dominated 
countries or media (including a large 
part of the German press), whereas 
Protestant, Islamic and Jewish 
voices tended more towards the 
»Frankenstein« or »Pandora’s Box« 
image as a warning against possible 
uncontrollable dangers (Schummer 
2011, p. 119 ff.).
All these images give rise more easily 
to scary (see below) messages about 
alleged artificial life than hopeful ones 
– the latter requires a connection with 
humanity’s great challenges: world 
food affairs, global health, global 
energy and raw materials demand 
or resolving global environmental 
problems. However, it seems that the 
current status of synthetic biology does 
not really allow these positive hype 
goals or visions to be underpinned. 
One probable reason for this is that 
practically all of those involved 
emphasise that only microorganisms 
will be manipulated for the foreseeable 
future. In medicine this results in 
possible application prospects for 
simpler and more efficient production 
of complicated pharmaceutical 
molecules or for the optimisation of 
gene therapy processes using better 
vectors, i.e. vehicles for introducing the 
therapeutic DNA or RNA molecules. 
Neither of these is a revolutionary 
new approach, which therefore means 
that projections relating to synthetic 
biology do not offer any completely 
new prospects in medicine.
A »hype message« is most easily 
associated with renewable raw 
materials and fuel production with 
the aid of algae and other protozoa 
»designed« de novo. The primary goal 
which can be defined here is to resolve 
the food vs. fuel problem with regard 
to the use of agricultural land and the 
protection of natural ecosystems (e.g. 
World Economic Forum 2010). This 
problem and its repercussions on food 
prices and the world food situation 
have become a central political and 
social point of contention with 
reference to the use of scientific and/or 
technical options. If visions of synthetic 
biology could render plausible a means 
of producing raw materials and fuels 
which saves land and resources, this 
would represent an ideal trigger for 
hype.
However, the communication of 
this vision has yet to really gain 
momentum. One reason could be that 
the debate on the global demand for 
energy and raw materials has become 
extremely complex, differentiated 
and controversial in recent years 
– completely independently of the 
developments in synthetic biology 
(SRU 2007; TAB 2010; WBGU 2009). 
It is difficult, therefore, for simplified 
proposed solutions and left-field visions 
to have an impact, in scientifically and 
politically relevant circles at least, but 
also in serious media. If genuine hype 
is to be generated here, it would have 
to be possible to report substantive 
results, e.g. relating to an increase in 
efficiency from the use of synthetic 
biology – but this is apparently not 
the case to date.
Because of their experience with the 
hope, hype and fear technology cycles 
up till now, secondary research and 
government funding bodies now react, 
depending on their point of view, as 
if this is all quite normal or with 
almost slightly hasty submissiveness. 
The natural sciences underpinning 
technology are scarcely able to meet 
the relevant demands with reference 
to producing new knowledge and 
developments. This results in the same 
old examples and considerations being 
brought up again and again, a reflex 
action which hardly any relevant 



















NSo, where is the hype in synthetic 
biology? Or does it not actually exist, 
and is it all just measured hopes 
without any exaggeration? The large 
number of projects, reports and state-
ments actually indicates that it must 
exist. One possible suspicion is that 
the hype surrounding synthetic biology 
is something that happens in the 
»observer community« (from the field of 
technology assessment and innovation 
analysis, philosophy of technology and 
bioethics, in other political consultancy 
and research funding bodies) – as it 
were in the »discursive superstructure« 
of synthetic biology.
FEAR: MONSTER GERMS FROM 
THE GARAGE AND OTHER 
GHOULS
Particular fears can be caused especially 
if something is entirely new or 
unknown, if it has the potential to cause 
significant damage or if people feel they 
may be especially affected by it.
Because of the lack of fundamental 
difference from previous developments 
in molecular biology and related 
research and applied fields, no concrete 
risk scenarios are actually emerging, 
given the current development status 
of synthetic biology. All the restrained 
statements on synthetic biology are in 
agreement here. At the same time they 
mostly also point out that this could 
change in the event of possible major 
development strides and that close, 
ongoing monitoring and analysis are 
therefore needed (please see in this 
regard the studies on the potentials of 
synthetic biology in box 2).
Such a step would be the »construction« 
of massively modified microorganisms, 
especially if they were to be used in the 
environment, outside of bioreactors. 
Such releases have not yet taken place, 
and many scientists regard this as 
unjustifiable. A recurrent idea is the 
thought of using synthetic biology 
methods to incorporate mechanisms in 
the future microbe creations which will 
prevent uncontrolled reproduction, e.g. 
by using molecules which do not occur 
in nature as a kind of »genetic firewall« 
(Marlière et al. 2011; Schmidt 2010).
However, more concrete fears 
are directed not only towards the 
targeted, monitored use of organisms 
or substances manufactured by means 
of synthetic biology, but also towards 
those produced by amateurs in garage 
laboratories, whether intentionally 
or simply accidentally. This would 
be the other side of the coin from the 
playful/creative attempts by academics 
and researchers – if a relevant number 
of people were actually to start using 
BioBricks for fun or to scare others. 
It is generally agreed that genetic 
engineering can now be carried out 
with comparatively little expertise 
and relatively inexpensive equipment. 
What is unclear, however, is how many 
»DNA DIYers« are already at work. 
However, the self-regulation within the 
associations of companies which are 
contracted by customers to produce 
large DNA molecules commercially as 
a raw material demonstrates that this 
danger is not regarded as irrelevant. In 
this the member companies undertake 
to check DNA orders for possible 
sequences of pathogens or toxins and 
also to document the orders and report 
suspicious orders to the authorities 
(IASB 2009).
On the other hand, attempts to impute 
an even greater danger to biodiversity 
BOX 1: SELECTED EUROPEAN AND GERMAN TA STUDIES AND INNOVATION ANALYSES 
IN SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
> »TESSY – Towards a European Strategy for Synthetic Biology« (Fraunhofer 
ISI, Karlsruhe; on behalf of the EU Commission; concluded 2009): analysis 
of the issue from the perspective of research and innovation strategies
> »SYNBIOSAFE: Safety and ethical aspects of synthetic biology« (ITA and 
IDC Vienna, University of Zurich, ISTHMUS SARL Paris; on behalf of the 
EU Commission; concluded 2009): analysis of safety-related and ethical 
aspects and the public debate on the issue
> »SYNTH-ETHICS« (Technical University of Delft, Dutch research institute 
TNO, the University of Padua, the Australian National University and ITAS, 
Karlsruhe; on behalf of the EU Commission; concluded 2011): analysis of 
ethical, legal and social implications
> »Making Perfect Life« (members of the European Technology Assessment 
Group: Rathenau Institute, The Hague, Fraunhofer ISI, Karlsruhe, ITA, 
Vienna, ITAS, Karlsruhe; on behalf of STOA, the TA panel of the European 
Parliament): Synthetic biology (»Engineering of Living Artefacts«) is one of 
four sub-themes (in addition to »Engineering of the Body, of the Brain and 
of Intelligent Artefacts«)
> »Engineering Life« (Institute for Ethics and History in Medicine and Centre 
for Biological Signalling Studies (BIOSS) at the University of Freiburg; ITAS, 
Karlsruhe; Theological Faculty of the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg; 
funded by the BMBF; start 2010): reflection on the ethical/philosophical 
and theological relevance of synthetic biology; analysis of the potential 
applications and statutory framework for dealing with potential threats
> »SynBioTA – innovation and technology assessment of synthetic biology« 
(University of Bremen; funded by the BMBF; start 2010): comprehensive 
analysis of potential with reference to future focuses of research policy
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N or the biosphere as a whole from the 
visions of synthetic biology than 
is represented by »classic« gene 
technology and generate public 
debate have remained astonishingly 
low-key. It may be assumed that the 
declared opponents are also finding it 
difficult to communicate a plausible 
definition and vision of synthetic 
biology which could be even scarier 
than the applications and objectives 
hitherto for genetic engineering. 
The warning against selling off 
nature and against the unforeseeable 
consequences for the environment and 
health and the scares about the world 
view and the (patenting) intentions of 
scientists, industry and government 
were intensive enough with (green) 
gene technology and cannot be 
convincingly further intensified 
by adding the attribute »extreme« 
(»extreme genetic engineering« was 
the label applied to synthetic biology 
for a time by the ETC Group; ETC 
2008).
The attempt to postulate a new form 
of protection, »evolutionary integrity«, 
and to introduce it into the debate about 
the protection of biodiversity, as in the 
case of the German non-governmental 
organisation »Testbiotech«, which is 
critical of gene technology (Then/
Hamberger 2010), is a more interesting 
concept. However, it is not yet possible 
to say whether this will fall on good 
soil and will perhaps be able to move 
the scientific debate forwards.
In addition to these worries about 
the intended (»biosecurity«) and 
unintended (»biosafety«) consequences 
for the environment and health, the 
ethical and theological concerns 
about mankind’s possible arrogance 
in shaping nature improperly to fit his 
own desires must be seen as part of 
the fears and anxieties about synthetic 
biology. Here, too, however, there are 
two factors which mean that, given 
the current state of synthetic biology, 
the warnings against playing God 
will ultimately have little effect: 
firstly, because, for the foreseeable 
future according to practically 
all scientists, the issue primarily 
involves microorganisms which are 
to be modified and shaped for human 
purposes, and secondly, because – as 
with the concerns about biosecurity 
and biosafety – horror stories have 
always been circulated warning 
of eventual overstepping of limits, 
such as the breeding of humans, in 
connection with much more advanced 
or even established technologies 
(preimplantation diagnosis, stem cell 
research, cloning, germline therapy). 
If synthetic biology is to cause specific 
and new fears, it would need more 
plausible scenarios than hitherto 
which would presumably have to refer 
at least to higher plants or animals.
GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES: 
PROMOTING RESEARCH AND 
DIALOGUE
The systematic monitoring of new 
scientific and technical developments 
with possible social, especially socio-
economic relevance has been practised 
by all major industrial countries for 
years. The EU Commission addressed 
synthetic biology as long ago as 
December 2003 under New and 
Emerging Science and Technology 
(NEST) and announced a project tender 
in the autumn of 2005 with a value of 
50 million euros. The major part of this 
went on scientific research projects, but 
a range of projects relating to the ethical, 
legal and social analysis and technology 
assessment (TA) of synthetic biology 
were also commissioned (box 1). In 
recent years reports and statements have 
been published by various bodies and 
institutes which advise governments, 
including in the Netherlands, the UK, 
Switzerland, Germany and the US 
(box 2).
A rigorous comparison of these 
documents in terms of relevant dif-
ferences is beyond the scope of this 
paper, though a few striking areas of 
commonality may be mentioned:
> None of the reports exaggerates 
the opportunities or risks of 
synthetic biology, which is not 
surprising in light of the constantly 
more comprehensive, deliberative 
approach, but is due to the early and 
as yet unclear development stage as 
described of most synthetic biology 
projects.
> Nevertheless, synthetic biology 
is judged to be an important 
development field with major 
potential that should be promoted 
systematically and comprehensively.
> All the statements from European 
countries and the EU at least clearly 
declare that a very important 
intention is to address the possible 
risks intensively from the outset, 
for precautionary reasons, on the 
one hand, and in order, on the 
other hand, to prevent a resulting 
debate in society blocking the use 
of potential opportunities.
> The key recommendations on 
action resulting from this are the 
consistent continued monitoring 
of the scientific and technical 
field, including a regular review of 
whether national and transnational 
funding and regulatory measures 
appear appropriate, together with 
a comprehensive social dialogue 
on the opportunities and risks and 
how to deal with them. The guiding 
principle is good governance in 
the sense of planned action by 
responsible government, scientific 
and business representatives.
It is clear that the analyses and 
assessments of synthetic biology are 
shaped by earlier experience with the 
associated technology fields – emerging 
or new technologies, technical sciences 



















NEthics Committee, commissioned 
the TAB with its current project, 
the relevant ministry, although also 
commissioning two TA projects 
(box  1), has otherwise consistently 
avoided using the term »synthetic 
biology« in its funding programmes. 
This becomes particularly clear in the 
Biotechnology 2020+ strategy process 
which includes practically all the 
R&D approaches which are usually 
covered under synthetic biology 
without using the label (see the 
»official« presentation of the strategy 
process in Wirsching 2011). One 
consequence of this is that the Federal 
Government stated in March 2011 in 
its response to a minor interpellation 
by the Social Democrats (SPD) in 
the German Bundestag that it has 
funded »no research and development 
projects to date specifically in 
synthetic biology« (Bundesregierung 
2011, p. 2). The impression could 
be given that Germany is lagging 
behind in this technological field 
or is concealing its involvement, as 
was suspected promptly by critics 
(Testbiotech 2011). Neither appears 
very plausible – perhaps the BMBF 
has simply decided to wait and see 
whether the term »synthetic biology« 
really catches on in the long term or 
falls out of fashion in just a few years, 
to be replaced by a different buzzword 
in the biosciences.
At any rate, the BMBF is thus closer 
to the researchers in the natural and 
technical sciences who frequently – 
unlike many external observers – do 
not use the term synthetic biology at all 
in relation to their projects. And, when 
dealing with the potentials of synthetic 
biology, this almost antiquated refusal 
to use the fashionable term can be seen 
at least as a prompt to repeatedly ask 
what the common feature really is in 
the different R&D lines mentioned 
initially.
Arnold Sauter
gene technology and nanotechnology. 
Following the largely hostile political 
and social response to green gene 
technology – in particular the planting 
of transgenic crops – in Europe in the 
1990s which was seen, at least by its 
proponents, as a disastrous failure and 
was blamed by many observers on poor 
communication, nanotechnology in the 
first decade of the new millennium 
offered an example of a significantly 
more complex, varied and assured 
discourse (as made clear in the paper 
by C. Revermann in this section).
In synthetic biology it is almost 
possible to gain the impression that 
the debate about opportunities and 
risks, while not in principle coming 
too soon, is nonetheless slightly too 
feverish. The fundamental uncertainty 
stated at the outset as to whether this is 
a meaningfully discrete field of science 
and technology leads to major problems 
of understanding, particularly with 
the general public, in association 
with the far from clear application 
prospects in the attempted public 
debate to date. In the case of synthetic 
biology, scientists and politicians are 
evidently especially susceptible to the 
Collingridge dilemma, with which TA 
and forward-looking technology design 
are fundamentally faced (Collingridge 
1980; Grunwald 2010b): If you don’t 
want to be too late, you’ll have to find 
your way in the dark.
For the German situation an evident 
but surprising feature should be 
noted when dealing with the problem 
of definition and understanding 
related to synthetic biology: while 
important professional associations 
and special interest groups within 
the German scientific community, 
especially the Leopoldina and acatech 
national academies, started to work 
extensively on the issue of synthetic 
biology as early as 2008 (box 2) and 
the Bundestag, as a consequence of 
initial soundings in its parliamentary 
BOX 2: SELECTED REPORTS AND STATEMENTS ON THE POTENTIALS OF SYNTHETIC 
BIOLOGY
> Netherlands: Commission on Genetic Modification (COGEM) (2008): 
Biological machines? Anticipating developments in synthetic biology.
> Germany: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), Deutsche Akademie 
der Technikwissenschaften (acatech), Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher 
Leopoldina (2009): Synthetische Biologie – Stellungnahme.
> United Kingdom: The Royal Academy of Engineering (ed.) (2009): Synthetic 
Biology: Scope, Applications and Implications. The Royal Academy of 
Engineering (ed.) (2009): Synthetic Biology: public dialogue on synthetic 
biology. Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council 
(BBSRC), Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC),
Sciencewise – ERC (2010): Synthetic Biology Dialogue.
> Switzerland: Schweizerische Eidgenössische Ethikkommission für die 
Biotechnologie im Ausserhumanbereich (EKAH) (2010): Synthetische 
Biologie – Ethische Überlegungen.
> EU: European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) 
(ed.) (2009): Ethics of synthetic biology. 
> Member States of the EU: The European Academies Science Advisory 
Council (EASAC) (2011): Realising European potential in synthetic biology: 
scientific opportunities and good governance. 
> USA: Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues (2010): New 
Directions. The Ethics of Synthetic Biology and Emerging Technologies.
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NGlobal warming as a result of the steady rise in concentration of greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere and combating the associated global problems with potentially 
catastrophic consequences represent one of the major challenges of the 21st 
century. The international efforts to counteract it by reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions have had little demonstrable effect to date. According to estimates by 
the International Energy Agency, CO2 emissions reached another new record level 
in 2010 – following a slight decline in 2009, the year of the economic and financial 
crisis. Against this backdrop, there are growing signs that the debate about 
geoengineering interventions, which has mainly been conducted in academic 
circles to date, could clearly gain momentum and increasingly also reach the 
political arena. 
The term geoengineering is less about 
a »new technology« in the sense of 
a fundamental technical innovation 
or a new branch of science forming 
a discrete research field. Rather, it 
is a collective term for methods and 
concepts – some of which have been 
available for a long time – whose aim, 
as set out in a frequently used but very 
vague definition of geoengineering, 
is an »intentional, large-scale 
manipulation of the environment« 
(Keith 2009). The actual new element 
in connection with the development of 
geoengineering technologies – which 
are a priori not at all restricted just 
to impacting on the climate – are 
thus not so much their technological 
principles, but rather the large scale 
of application of these technologies 
which has been announced. However, 
a precise and universally accepted 
definition which would enable 
unambiguous identification of which 
technologies and concepts with which 
scale of application merit the label 
geoengineering has yet to become 
established.
Against the backdrop of anthropogenic 
global warming, attention in recent 
times has been increasingly captured 
precisely by such geoengineering 
concepts which are intended to have 
a temperature-reducing impact by 
means of large-scale interventions in 
climate-related global cycles in order 
to check or even reverse the anticipated 
climate change. This ambitious goal 
is an indication of the necessary 
magnitude of these interventions – also 
termed climate engineering (CE) in 
this context and below: an intentional 
manipulation of the environment on a 
global scale. There is as yet no example 
in the history of human culture of a 
technology whose development and 
implementation could satisfy both 
attributes – intentional and global – 
whereas an example of a technology 
which is impacting unintentionally 
and on a global scale can quickly be 
cited: energy production based on fossil 
fuels whose unintentional consequence 
is the warming of the planet which is 
becoming ever clearer (Keith 2009).
The development of CE technologies 
differs from other technology creation 
routes in one further aspect: whereas 
new scientific findings combined with 
technical progress are often regarded 
as key drivers of new technology 
developments whose application 
fields and potential uses still have to 
be identified in some cases (please 
see in this regard the contributions 
on nanotechnology by C. Revermann 
and on synthetic biology by A. Sauter), 
the development of CE technologies 
can be interpreted as a search for 
solutions with a clear objective 
(reduction in the Earth’s temperature). 
Against this background it should 
not be a surprise that in some cases 
long familiar technologies or – from 
a technical viewpoint – almost trivial 
concepts, though which are intended to 
meet their brief by means of a major 
increase in their scale of application, 
come under discussion.
At the same time the scaling-up of 
technologies to a global scale of 
application means that possible risks 
and/or unknown or unintended side 
effects and repercussions could also 
grow to the same extent. Earth’s entire 
population may potentially have to bear 
the possible consequences and risks of 
the technology, with varying effects in 
terms of extent and time. Consequently, 
in the event of the development and 
large-scale implementation of CE 
technologies it is not just engineers and 
natural scientists who will face a major 
challenge, but also researchers in the 




What concrete approaches and ideas 
can be placed under the heading of CE 
technologies? Differentiation of the 
technologies into interventions which 
influence the global radiation balance 
such that less short-wave solar radiation 
is absorbed by the Earth’s surface or 
atmosphere and converted to heat 
(solar radiation management, SRM) 
and into interventions in the global 
CO2 cycle with the goal of reducing 
the atmospheric CO2 concentration 
(carbon dioxide removal, CDR) in 
order to eliminate the actual cause of 
global warming represents a systematic 
means of classification (in this regard 
and with reference to the following, 
Royal Society 2009).
INFLUENCING THE GLOBAL RADIATION 
BALANCE
In terms of influencing the global 
radiation balance, some of the solar 
radiation could be diverted into space 
using space-based systems before 
GEOENGINEERING:
COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE WITH WHITE PAINT?
26

















N The delivery of sulphate aerosols 
into the stratosphere is the subject of 
intense debate since it is already known 
from volcanic eruptions that sulphate 
aerosols in the atmosphere can generate 
a cooling effect (Crutzen 2006).
INFLUENCING THE GLOBAL CO2 CYCLE
While the concepts for influencing 
the global radiation balance aim at 
compensating for the global warming 
caused by the greenhouse effect by 
reducing the net incoming solar 
radiation received, the objective of 
interventions for influencing the global 
CO2 cycle is to stabilise or lower the 
atmospheric CO2 concentration, and 
such interventions therefore address 
the root of the problem. One of the 
best known examples for CE in this 
category is the fertilisation of large 
areas of open ocean with nutrients (e.g. 
iron). The intention is to stimulate the 
growth of algae artificially, thereby 
fixing more CO2 from the atmosphere 
in the algal biomass which would then 
– according to the theory – sink into 
the deep ocean with the dead algal 
biomass. The high level of awareness of 
ocean fertilisation methods compared 
with other CE proposals is a result of 
the fact that this is the only CE idea for 
which field trials have taken place on a 
significant scale to date – accompanied 
by public controversy over the legality 
and meaningfulness of these trials, such 
as the German-Indian »LOHAFEX« 
experiment clearly demonstrated in the 
spring of 2009. 
A similarly simple proposal from a 
technical perspective provides for large 
quantities of biomass to be converted 
into stable carbon compounds (biochar) 
by heating in the absence of air in 
order to remove them from the natural 
cycle of biological decomposition. 
Regional concepts from the fields of 
agriculture and forestry, based on 
natural processes for sequestering 
CO2 from the atmosphere, are also 
it even reaches the geosphere or, on 
the other hand, the reflectiveness of 
the Earth system (termed albedo) 
could be increased. The first category 
includes, for example, the proposal 
to shade the Earth by means of giant 
sun-shields to be positioned between 
the Earth and the sun to reflect or 
deflect the solar radiation. Assuming 
the shields can be precisely controlled, 
direct »weather control« would even 
become conceivable since the intensity 
of the solar radiation could be adapted 
regionally (Keith 2009).
In view of the enormous logistical 
demands involved in transporting the 
sun-shields to their destination, these 
concepts are pure science fiction at 
present. By contrast, the CE concepts 
for increasing the Earth’s albedo, 
whose basically very simple principle 
is to make the Earth brighter overall, 
is easier to implement – even though it 
would entail appropriate efforts. The 
ideas, which are surprisingly simple 
from a technical viewpoint in some 
cases, include (Rösch et al. 2010; 
Leisner/Müller-Klieser 2010):
> Increasing the brightness of the 
Earth’s surface – e.g. by painting 
roofs and roads white, planting 
fields and grasslands with more 
reflective plant types and varieties 
or covering deserts with reflective 
films;
> Enhancing the reflectivity of 
the lowest atmospheric layer 
(troposphere) – e.g. by artificially 
whitening  low-lying marine clouds 
with the aid of sea salt aerosols 
which are sprayed into the clouds 
by unmanned boats;
> Enhancing the reflectivity of 
the atmospheric layer above the 
troposphere (stratosphere) – e.g. 
by delivering sulphate aerosols or 
aluminium nanoparticles, which 
help to scatter or reflect sunlight, 
into the stratosphere by means of 
aircraft.
under discussion (Rösch et al. 2010): 
these methods, also collated under the 
term »climate farming«, entail, for 
example, afforestation, reforestation 
and avoidance of deforestation, 
conserving and expanding bogs or 
avoiding turning grassland into arable 
land in order to maintain or replenish 
the terrestrial carbon store.
Carbon dioxide capture and storage 
(CCS) from industrial flue gases 
and the direct removal of CO2 from 
ambient air (»air capture«) with the 
aid of »artificial trees« are technically 
more challenging. Both processes 
presuppose that long-term, secure 
storage of large quantities of CO2 in 
geological formations is feasible.
The CE proposals outlined – which 
do not claim to be exhaustive – can 
be classified according to their effort/
effect ratio (Leisner/Müller-Klieser 
2010):
> CE interventions with a small 
effort/effect ratio (which are 
also termed measures with a 
»large lever«) unleash a large and 
generally immediate effect with 
comparatively little effort and 
cost. CE concepts for increasing 
the reflectivity of the atmosphere 
and fertilising large areas of ocean 
fall into this category.
> CE interventions with a large effort/
effect ratio aim to use a large input 
of labour and technical equipment in 
order to compensate for greenhouse 
gas emissions on a tonne-for-tonne 
basis or influence the radiation 
balance by changing the colour of 
the Earth’s surface. This category 
includes the production of biochar, 
the creation of whole forests of 
artificial trees, the plan to paint 
all roofs and roads white and the 
proposed climate farming solutions. 
These interventions do not represent 
a quick fix for climate stabilisation 



















Nhopes of ultimately also being able 
to exercise control over the weather 
and climate thanks to scientific and 
technical advances. At that time no one 
suspected that the manipulation of the 
global climate had already started as 
an unintended consequence of precisely 
such technical advances – which we 
are experiencing ever more markedly 
today. The wish to shape our climate 
to suit our needs with the aid of large-
scale technology-based interventions is 
thus now motivated less by mankind’s 
desire to dominate nature, and more by 
the hope of having an emergency plan 
to safeguard our survival in the event 
that efforts to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions fail.
The results of the international climate 
policy, which have generally been 
disappointing to date, really do make 
it doubtful whether the goal of limiting 
the rise in global warming to 2 °C above 
the pre-industrial level can actually be 
achieved by reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. It is from this fear that many 
scientists derive their view that research 
into the opportunities and risks of CE 
interventions should not be a taboo 
subject but rather should be supported, 
even if it is usually emphasised at the 
same time that top priority must be 
given to the »classic« strategies for 
dealing with climate change – reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions (mitigation 
strategies) and adapting to climate 
change (adaptation strategies) – (e.g. 
Crutzen 2006; Royal Society 2009, 
p. ix). A weighty argument put forward 
by many proponents – known as the 
arming-the-future argument – states 
that is it almost a moral imperative 
to identify suitable CE technologies 
with minimal risks at the earliest 
possible stage in order to be able to 
offer future generations an optimum 
knowledge base for all possible actions 
and, if appropriate, also a last-resort, 
a »plan B«, against global warming 
(please see the box for a selection of 
pro and contra arguments).
probably only proceed slowly and 
will require major effort.
It is generally believed that CE 
technologies with a large effort/effect 
ratio can be better controlled and 
monitored than interventions with 
a »large lever« (in particularly their 
use can be geographically delimited 
and halted faster in the event of 
unacceptable consequences) and entails 
fewer risks and side effects (Ott 2010; 
Rösch et al. 2010). In view of this, 
many scientists are of the opinion that 
only technologies with a »large lever« 
merit the term CE.
HOPE: PLAN B FOR 
EMERGENCIES
Mankind’s long-standing desire to 
shape the environment or the climate 
in accordance with his own ideas and 
wishes by means of technical solutions 
is also addressed in the novels of 
Jules Verne (e.g. Sardemann 2010). 
In his novel »The Purchase of the 
North Pole«, published in 1889, for 
instance, the Baltimore Gun Club plans 
to shift the Earth’s axis as a result of 
the recoil from a gigantic cannonball 
such that the polar ice of the Arctic 
could be melted, freeing the Earth’s 
population at the same time from the 
annoying fluctuations of the seasons. 
The prospect of a more constant 
climate which would allow every 
citizen of Earth to live in a pleasant, 
stable climate zone initially results 
in worldwide agreement with and 
enthusiasm for the project. The Gun 
Club’s action is, of course, primarily 
motivated by the goal of accessing the 
coal reserves thought to be under the 
ice and less by the prospect of helping 
mankind.
The technical optimism documented 
in Jules Verne’s novels and fed by the 
rapid pace of technical development 
of those years may have awoken 
The scientific interest in CE tech-
nologies could grow stronger still if 
is confirmed that »tipping elements« 
could represent an additional danger. 
These are critical subsystems within 
the climate system which could be 
switched into a qualitatively different 
state with potentially serious impacts if 
a system-dependent temperature level 
(the tipping point) were to be exceeded. 
It cannot be ruled out, for example, 
that a critical temperature level, which 
could trigger the continuing melting of 
the Arctic and Greenland ice, could be 
reached with global warming of less 
than 2 °C above the current level, i.e. 
possibly within this century. Additional 
solar radiation would be absorbed by 
the darker ocean and land masses, 
causing the rate of temperature rise 
to accelerate still further (ice-albedo 
feedback) – a development which could 
result in the complete disappearance of 
these ice caps in the summer within just 
a few centuries and a rise in sea levels 
by up to 7 m (Lenton et al. 2008). 
The announcement by the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) that its fifth assessment report 
scheduled for 2013/2014 will for the 
first time assess possible impacts of 
CE proposals on human and natural 
systems and on mitigation cost, as well 
as evaluate options for appropriate 
governance mechanisms of CE 
options is an indication that scientists 
really are increasingly placing their 
hopes in potential CE technologies – 
because hopes are dwindling at the 
same time that the required reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions can 
be achieved within the target time-
scale (www.ipcc-wg3.de/meetings/
expert-meetings-and-workshops/em-
geoengineering; 11.8.2011). It is to 
be expected that the issue of CE will 
therefore increasingly move into the 
focus of public discourse and gain 
momentum. NGOs and environmental 
organisations are already criticising the 
IPCC because the mere fact of describing 
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N possible CE technologies could push 
the actual target of emissions reduction 
further and further into the background 
(see also the moral-hazard argument in 
the box). This could ultimately further 
hamper the already difficult climate 
negotiations and increasingly exert 
pressure on the political decision-
making process with reference to, for 
instance, funding programmes for CE 
research or to the licensing of large-
scale field trials.
HYPE: CLIMATE PROBLEM 
SOLVED!
A possible and probable scenario for 
the ongoing CE debate could therefore 
be a rise in the number of those within 
the scientific community declaring 
themselves in favour of considered, 
internationally coordinated research 
into CE technologies in order to be 
forearmed and in a position to act in 
the event of an emergency.
However, a different scenario can also 
be pictured: CE technologies could be 
not only an emergency strategy but 
also perhaps a possible alternative to 
the classic climate protection strategies 
of avoidance and adaptation. It could, 
for example, be conceivable that 
research into and the development 
and deployment of CE technologies 
could be advocated not primarily by 
scientists but by the general public in 
view of the laborious and expensive 
efforts involved in avoidance and 
adaptation actions. The following 
framework conditions would underpin 
such a scenario, which is still purely 
hypothetical from today’s perspective:
> Research results could show that 
certain CE technologies would offer 
a simple, effective and – compared 
with the classic strategies – very 
inexpensive and resource-friendly 
technical solution to the climate 
problem (efficiency argument);
> CE interventions would – compared 
with the classic strategies – be 
perceived as having far less impact 
on people’s existing lifestyles and 
ownership structures, particularly 
in societies which are geared 
towards prosperity (easiness 
argument);
> As a consequence of global warming, 
climate-related environmental 
disasters causing major damage 
could occur regularly in future. 
This could increase the acceptance 
of CE technologies in light of 
the unknown risks (lesser-evil 
argument);
> Most CE concepts can be illustrated 
in very simple images and thus be 
easily communicated to the general 
public. The CE technologies with a 
»large lever« in particular really can 
be compared with the idea of the 
Gun Club from Jules Verne’s novel 
in terms of their technical approach: 
pouring large quantities of iron 
into the oceans, delivering sulphur 
aerosols into the stratosphere by 
means of tanker aircraft, weather 
balloons or cannons (!) or painting 
all building roofs and roads white;
> In societies with a pronounced 
technical optimism far less attention 
would be paid to the possible risks 
and side effects, while the hoped-
for benefit of the technology, on 
the other hand, would be greatly 
overestimated;
> Under certain circumstances »large-
lever« CE technologies could 
be implemented unilaterally by 
individual states or special-interest 
groups with the corresponding 
resources. International consent 
would therefore not be a necessary 
prerequisite for the use of CE – 
those states which reject this action 
would be faced with a fait accompli.
The significant increase in media 
reporting of the CE issue in the last ten 
years compared with the 1990s indeed 
indicates that – in addition to interest 
among scientists – the public interest in 
CE technologies is continuing to grow 
(e.g. ETC 2010, p. 12). This could be 
interpreted as the first indication of a 
»hype cycle« (Konrad 2011, p. 157 f.): 
the positive expectations of what 
technology can deliver are gaining ever 
broader acceptance and are being rated 
ever more optimistically, accompanied 
by a strong increase in interest from the 
media. As a rule, such a »hype phase« 
culminates in exaggerated expectations 
which regularly prove infeasible in 
practice, at which point the expectant 
attitude disappears and the (public) 
interest settles back down. Only after 
this »disappointment phase« are the 
potentials of a technology assessed 
more realistically.
It seems plausible that none of the 
CE technologies has already peaked 
in terms of a comprehensive »hype 
phase«. If, however, it were to come 
to a marked level of public hype, which 
could easily take on global dimensions 
in light of the scale of use, the public 
pressure on political decision-makers 
would probably rise further still. The 
following quotation from US politician 
Newt Gingrich illustrates that this view 
is not entirely without foundation: 
»Geoengineering holds forth the 
promise of addressing global warming 
concerns for just a few billion dollars 
a year. Instead of penalizing ordinary 
Americans, we would have an option to 
address global warming by rewarding 
scientific innovation …« (after ETC 
2010, p. 14).
Interestingly, some of the proposed 
CE concepts have already undergone 
such a »hype cycle« within the science 
community. For example, the results 
of a series of small-scale trials of iron 
fertilisation of the oceans show that 
the initial optimistic expectations 
relating to the induced algal bloom 
and the sinking rate of the biomass 
were not achieved and consequently the 



















NWith reference to the »large-lever« CE 
technologies in particular, a comparable 
scenario of possibly frivolous unilateral 
action by private foundations, the 
world’s richest individuals (Keith 2009) 
or governments acting in isolation does 
not seem to be plucked entirely out 
of thin air. Companies could also be 
tempted to such a careless use of these 
technologies in order to pocket a large 
profit in return for a small level of 
expenditure, e.g. by selling CO2 emission 
certifications to which – if »negative« 
emissions of CE interventions in the CO2 
cycle were to be recognised in future 
within the framework of the market-
based instruments of international 
climate policy – these companies 
would be entitled (Wiertz/Reichwein 
2010). A glance at the large number 
of patent applications in the field, for 
instance, of technological solutions for 
biochar production, the manufacture of 
artificial trees or the optimum supply 
of nutrients for marine algae appears 
to lend support to the assumption that 
speculation on such a recognition of CE 
technologies is in progress (e.g. ETC 
2010, p. 30 ff.).
The »large-lever« CE technologies in 
particular can entail significant risks 
and side effects which are not regionally 
limited because they intervene in 
sensitive cycles and could therefore 
have unintended impacts with, under 
certain circumstances, far-reaching 
consequences for environmental and 
socio-economic systems on a global 
level. A further cause for concern is 
the fact that the necessary field trials 
which would have to be conducted on a 
sufficiently large scale to eliminate any 
final uncertainties could themselves have 
unwanted and harmful repercussions 
which – given the complex interactions 
that pertain – could remain undetected 
for a long period or may not have their 
cause identified.
Sulphate aerosols, for example, once 
generated, can remain in the atmosphere 
greatly overestimated. At the same 
time, it is becoming more and more 
clear that very little is known so far 
about the very complex interactions of 
maritime life and that the possible risks 
and consequential impacts of such an 
intervention are largely unknown (e.g. 
Strong et al. 2009).
FEAR: IT COULD ALSO GO 
WRONG
After the initial euphoria for the 
Gun Club’s plan in Jules Verne’s 
novel, the mood is quickly reversed 
once the news, review and feature 
pages of all the world’s newspapers 
start to look into the side effects 
of the intervention: the flooding or 
creation of entire continents, climatic 
turbulences and the destruction of 
huge tracts of land as a result of the 
enormous recoil of the cannon, among 
other things,  are expected. But by the 
time the governments of the world 
would like to halt the undertaking, 
the Gun Club has already started 
construction of the giant cannon in 
an unknown location which the rest 
of the world is unable to trace. The 
drama proceeds.
SELECTION OF PRO AND CONTRA ARGUMENTS ON CLIMATE ENGINEERING
Pro arguments
> Arming-the-future argument: We are morally obliged to examine every opti-
on in order to offer future generations the optimum basis on which to make 
decisions. Linked to this is the last-resort argument: we should prepare our-
selves for emergencies so that unpopular options are also available.
> Easiness argument: CE is less difficult to implement in political and cultu-
ral terms than motivating people and industry to avoid emissions. Unpopular
interventions in lifestyles, habits and economic ownership structures could 
be avoided.
> Efficiency argument: Direct and indirect costs of CE interventions are 
lower than the costs of avoidance and adaptation. It would be a waste of 
resources to prioritise avoidance and adaptation.
> Lesser-evil argument: The consequences of CE interventions, when compa-
red with those of unrestrained climate change, could constitute the lesser evil 
overall.
Contra arguments
> Moral-hazard argument: The mere prospect of CE as the answer to our pro-
blems will cause many players to continue to emit large volumes of CO2.
> Termination-problem argument: The use of CE technologies could give 
rise to a dilemma in future: if highly problematical side effects were to 
have occurred and, at the same time, the concentration of greenhouse 
gases were to have increased, future generations would be faced with the 
dilemma of either living with these side effects or bringing about rapid 
climate change by abruptly stopping the CE intervention.
> Risk-transfer argument: The risks caused by an economic model associated 
with high emissions will be passed down unfairly to future generations.
> Informed-consent argument: Actions with global and long-term impacts 
would only be legitimate if there were to be broad informed consent by those 
affected. Strictly speaking, that would be all people living now and in the 
future and would mean a legitimacy condition which can scarcely be met.
Source: according to Ott 2010
30

















N for several years and display their effect. 
Possible risks and repercussions of the 
method – based on model calculations 
and observations following major 
volcanic eruptions – are addressed in the 
Royal Society’s report (2009, p. 29 f.) 
(see also Crutzen 2006; Leisner/Müller-
Klieser 2010):
> Global impacts on vegetation, 
forests, agricultural yields and the 
carbon cycle as a result of possible 
changes in the distribution of 
rainfall and wind and in incident 
solar energy;
> Modifications to the Asian and 
African summer monsoon, reducing 
precipitation and thus potentially 
impacting the food supply to 
billions of people;
> Reduction in stratospheric ozone;
> Some whitening on the sky;
> So far unexplored feedback 
mechanisms could have additional 
significant effects on atmospheric 
processes.
In addition to these specific risks, 
this method also shares the problems 
of all interventions in the global 
solar radiation balance: Since these 
do not eliminate the actual cause of 
global warming – the high man-made 
concentration of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere – the (negative) impacts 
associated with the high greenhouse 
gas content (e.g. acidification of the 
oceans) are not corrected; on the 
contrary, they are further amplified. 
In addition, the cooling of the climate 
by means of these methods would 
have to be continued over decades 
or centuries since halting the action 
would result in a sudden, rapid rise 
in temperature which would scarcely 
allow mankind to implement the then 
necessary adaptation strategies in good 
time (termination-problem argument). 
In view of the possible global risks and 
repercussions of a technology which 
may have to be applied over several 
generations, a decision about deploying 
or not deploying it cannot be taken 
solely on the basis of technological 
and scientific criteria (feasibility, 
climatic effectiveness, environmental 
risks etc.) or cost considerations; 
rather, it also requires an evaluation 
based on ethical, socio-economic, 
legal (including international law), 
political and, possibly, other criteria. 
In fact, up till now, a technological/
scientific perspective dominates, 
whereas research in the social sciences, 
humanities and law has only been 
addressing CE technologies in depth 
for just a few years.
The issues to be addressed by social 
scientists and legal academics are very 
ambitious. One issue to be discussed, 
for example, is the question of which 
body has the legitimacy and capability, 
in light of the potentially high risks 
and possibly based on an uncertain 
knowledge base, to take an accountable 
decision about the use or non-use of 
CE technologies in accordance with 
ethical standards. Such a decision 
would have to morally justify the fact 
that benefits and risks may well be 
distributed unevenly and that certain 
population groups could be affected 
more seriously by the adverse impacts 
for the benefit of others or that the 
problems caused today would be passed 
on to future generations (risk-transfer 
argument). But how could the risks 
(and opportunities) be communicated 
openly and transparently so that all 
those affected by the action can develop 
their own informed view and contribute 
actively to the decision-making process 
(informed-consent argument)?
Furthermore, there is no international 
mechanism which deals explicitly 
with CE or which could be applied in 
a comprehensive and legally binding 
manner to the various CE technologies. 
On the one hand, this is because CE 
represents a very heterogeneous group 
of technologies and there is as yet no 
definition on which a consensus might 
be reached. On the other hand, most 
CE concepts so far only exist as an idea 
or in computer models, and to date no 
one has seriously considered using the 
technology. However, the controversy 
surrounding the German-Indian 
»LOHAFEX« experiment of fertilising 
the ocean with iron, for instance, 
shows that there is a definite need for 
debate and action with reference to 
regulating CE.
Against the backdrop of transnational 
or global, possibly regionally differ-
entiated, side effects and repercussions, 
the conventions based on international 
law, such as those negotiated in relation 
to earlier international climate and 
environmental polices, could act as a 
role model for such a global governance 
of CE technologies. At the same time, 
however, the climate negotiations 
of the past illustrate how difficult 
international agreement can be.
Furthermore, the fact that CE 
interventions could, under certain 
circumstances, be carried out by 
individual states or by small numbers of 
states in isolation would jeopardise the 
principle of consensus – a cornerstone 
of international climate policy (the 
targeted reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions is only achievable in a joint 
show of strength). In connection with 
conventions on CE technologies, this 
principle would no longer have a key 
role to play: in particular, nations 
could claim national security interests 
as a reason for defying existing 
international norms and agreements, 
especially as these frequently tend to 
be more of a recommendation and less 
of a legally binding character (Wiertz/
Reichwein 2010).
OUTLOOK
On the one hand, CE research, which 



















Nseasons, and disaster is not visited 
upon them. Let us hope, should it 
ever actually become necessary to use 
»large-lever« CE technologies, that no 
calculation errors are made!
Claudio Caviezel
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